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SELF-DEFENSE UNDER SIEGE:  CREEPING 
CRIMINALIZATION OF INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE IN THE 
U.S. MILITARY 
BRIAN L. BENGS*† 
All U.S. jurisdictions recognize individual self-defense as an inherent 
right belonging to each person.  As an inherent right, self-defense is 
rooted firmly in natural law, as opposed to positive law, which entails 
a revocable grant from a sovereign.  This article contends that prior 
legal recognition of such an inherent right precludes a sovereign from 
unilaterally limiting an individual military member’s exercise of or 
claim to self-defense.  The story of U.S. Marine Corps Medal of Honor 
recipient Sergeant Dakota L. Meyer serves as a vehicle for the 
argument that the U.S. military is improperly limiting the right of 
individual self-defense and the closely related doctrine of defense of 
others.  In support of this contention, the scope of individual self-
defense guaranteed by the criminal justice systems of the U.S. military 
and a majority of states is compared with the scope of self-defense 
permitted for U.S. military personnel operating in a foreign 
battlespace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[N]ature commits to each his own protection.”1 
A voice crackled across the radio: “If we don’t receive fire support, 
we’re going to die out here.”2  Corporal (“Cpl.”) Dakota L. Meyer of 
the United States (“U.S.”) Marine Corps heard the call and cringed.  On 
September 8, 2009, in the Ganjgal Valley of Afghanistan, a battle raged.  
A joint American-Afghan contingent sent to interface with local village 
leadership was ambushed by Taliban fighters firing rocket propelled 
grenades, mortars, and machine guns from houses and fortified 
positions on the slopes above.  Positioned a short distance from the 
melee, Cpl. Meyer could only watch as the valley erupted with gunfire.3 
 
       *   Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Northern State University; Lieutenant 
Colonel (Ret.), U.S. Air Force; LL.M. 2007, The George Washington University; 
M.A. 2007, Louisiana Tech University; J.D. 1996, The University of Iowa; B.A. 1994, 
Iowa State University.  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
      †    I am grateful to a former Air Force colleague, Brendan M. Groves, for 
significant contributions to early drafts of this paper. 
1.  STEPHEN C. NEFF, HUGO GROTIUS ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: 
STUDENT EDITION 82 (2012). 
2. The Obama White House, Medal of Honor for Sergeant Dakota L. Meyer, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 15, 2011),  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vahLBesP3yk. 
3. Id.; CJ Chivers, Top Medal for Marine Who Saved Many Lives, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2011, at A14. 
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Another voice came across the radio.  Fire support was denied.  The 
words from headquarters hit Cpl. Meyer hard.  He radioed headquarters 
for permission to engage the enemy in defense of his colleagues.  
Permission denied.  He requested again and again, a total of four times.  
Each time he was denied.  If his superiors couldn’t save his friends, Cpl. 
Meyer would.  “We’re going in,” he told his friend, Staff Sergeant 
(“SSgt.”) Juan Rodriguez-Chavez.4  SSgt. Rodriguez-Chavez drove 
their Humvee into the kill zone while Cpl. Meyer manned the turret, his 
body exposed “to a blizzard of fire from AK-47s and machine guns, 
from mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.”5   
The pair rushed headlong into the inferno.  Cpl. Meyer picked up 
fallen Afghan soldiers, placing them in the Humvee and driving them 
back to safety.  They turned back and went in a second time.  Then a 
third.  By the fourth trip, Cpl. Meyer was wounded, his arm struck by 
shrapnel.6  The end seemed near.  In his words: “I didn’t think I was 
going to die. I knew I was.”7 The duo made a final, fifth trip, finding 
the lifeless bodies of four Americans lying “together as one team.”8  
Still under fire, they brought the bodies back to base.  All told, their 
actions saved the lives of thirty-six soldiers.9   
Cpl. Meyer’s exploits earned him the Medal of Honor.  A citation 
from the Department of Defense memorializes his heroism.10  But his 
actions could have been memorialized for eternity in the equally 
official, yet strikingly different, form of a court-martial charge sheet 
detailing his crimes.  In defying direct orders—four of them—Cpl. 
Meyer broke the law.11  That he ultimately shared a stage with the 
President, instead of a cell with another military prisoner, is a 
remarkable twist in American military history.  The irony of this 
dichotomy—between praise and punishment—was not lost on now-
 






10. See U.S. MARINE CORPS, Official Citation: Medal of Honor—Cpl. Dakota 
Meyer, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20111124043800/http://www.marines.mil/community/P
ages/MedalofHonorSgtDakotaMeyer-citation.aspx (last visited Feb. 29, 2020). 
11. Art. 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.A. § 892. 
3
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Sergeant (“Sgt.”) Meyer.  He would later reminisce: “I was either going 
to be a hero or a zero . . . something like either in jail or get a medal.”12   
Sgt. Meyer’s story exposes a critical conundrum in modern military 
law: the role of individual self-defense in the battlespace.  It was no 
accident that higher headquarters denied Sgt. Meyer’s calls to engage 
the enemy in defense of himself and his peers.  In modern 
counterinsurgency warfare, commanders seek to closely control the 
actions of their troops, lest the actions of a single soldier—even if well-
intentioned—produce negative strategic outcomes, potentially 
undermining the entire campaign.  As the Counterinsurgency Manual 
puts it: “Sometimes Doing Nothing is the Best Reaction.”13  Sgt. 
Meyer’s situation illustrates the fact that commanders cannot control 
the risk of allowing a military member to personally decide when his 
and his peers’ lives are sufficiently endangered to warrant invocation of 
self-defense.  Thus, self-defense in the battlespace is now by permission 
only.  
The concept of individual self-defense is under siege in the U.S. 
military.  In 2005, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff released a new edition 
of the Standing Rules of Engagement (“U.S. SROE 2005”) that quietly 
overhauled the rules on self-defense.14  The version it replaced (“U.S. 
SROE 2000”) heralded individual self-defense as the “inherent right to 
use all necessary means available and to take appropriate actions to 
defend oneself and U.S. forces in one’s vicinity.”15  U.S. SROE 2005 
enacted sweeping changes.  Most jarringly, individual soldiers no 
longer enjoy a personal right of self-defense.16  Instead, the right 
 
12. Marines TV, Medal of Honor: Dakota Meyer in His Own Words, U.S. 
MARINE CORPS (Sept. 15, 2011), https://www.marines.mil/News/Marines-
TV/videoid/126303/?dvpTag=Medal%20of%20Honor. 
13. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-27 
(Dec. 2006) [hereinafter FM 3-24]. 
14. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION (CJCSI) 3121.01B, 
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (2005) [hereinafter U.S. SROE 
2005]. 
15. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION (CJCSI) 3121.01A, 
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES, Enclosure A, para. 5(e) (2000) 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter U.S. SROE 2000]. 
16. See U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 3(a). 
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss2/3
Bengs camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2020  9:26 AM 
2020] SELF-DEFENSE UNDER SIEGE 341 
belongs solely to unit commanders.17  Individual self-defense becomes 
an afterthought—”a subset of unit self-defense.”18   
These changes are more than merely academic.  Under the new 
regime, American military members enjoy weaker self-defense 
protections on a foreign battlefield than an average American citizen 
enjoys on the streets of a U.S. city.19  Military members like Sgt. Meyer 
are forced to choose between saving themselves and their friends or 
breaking the law.20  Imposition of such a conundrum is inherently 
unjust and unnecessary.21   
This article articulates four principal reasons why the changes to 
the concept of self-defense promulgated in U.S. SROE 2005 are 
improper.  The first reason is rooted in natural law, which mandates that 
the act of self-defense is a right, not a privilege.  As a natural law right, 
it cannot be unduly curtailed by positive law enactments.  Preserved 
from Roman times22 and refined over the centuries, self-defense 




19. Compare U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 3(a) 
(classifying individual self-defense as a subset of unit self-defense, thus permitting 
commanders to withhold permission to use force in self-defense), with FLA. STAT. § 
776.012(2) (2016) (stating a reasonable belief that use of deadly force is necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm is the only requirement necessary to 
justify self-defense). 
20. North Carolina Congressman Walter Jones raised questions in early 2010 
about whether the Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan unduly circumscribed troops’ 
ability to defend themselves.  See Dan Lamothe, Lawmaker: Rules of Engagement 
Must Be Reviewed by Congress, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, available 
at https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:7Y
B2-XG00-Y9DT-J456-00000-00&context=1516831. 
21. In a letter to several other Congressmen who had expressed concerns about 
the rules of engagement, Missouri Congressman Ike Skelton, chair of the House 
Armed Services Committee, stated he had a “deep interest in ensuring that the 
members of the Armed Forces serve in conditions which allow them to act in self 
defense and provide sufficient force protection.”  He indicated his intent to schedule 
a classified committee briefing on the topic.  See Dan Lamothe, Lawmakers to Review 
Afghanistan ROE, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, available at 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:516
W-8YF1-DYJJ-P0S8-00000-00&context=1516831. 
22. David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the 
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, 241 (2008) [hereinafter Kopel, The Natural Right 
of Self-Defense]. 
5
Bengs: Self-Defense Under Siege:  Creeping Criminalization of Individual
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Bengs camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2020  9:26 AM 
342 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
ocean of positive international law.23  Substantial authority suggests 
natural law rights of this sort continue to play a role in both domestic24 
and international25 legal systems.  
The second reason centers on comparative considerations, namely 
the place of self-defense in the laws of U.S. allies in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (“NATO”).  Unlike the U.S., NATO protects 
individual self-defense on the battlefield by affirmatively 
acknowledging its status as an inherent right, incapable of undue 
regulation by a sovereign.26   
The third argument against U.S. SROE 2005 is pragmatic.  Sound 
military theory, encapsulated within the U.S. Army’s mission command 
doctrine, is premised upon individual decision making regarding the use 
of force.  Indeed, “[i]ndividual initiative is the key component of 
mission command” because “the willingness to act in the absence of 
orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when 
unforeseen opportunities or threats arise” has long been understood as 
the key to military success.27  The Army relied, to a great extent, upon 
the German military doctrine of Auftragstaktik when developing its 
mission command and unified land operations concept.28  
Auftragstaktik implicitly requires commanders to empower individual 
 
23. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 397 (reprint of 1737 
English translation by John Morrice of the 1724 annotated French translation by Jean 
Barbeyrac) (1625), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php?title=
1877&Itemid=99999999. 
24. For an example in American law see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (“[I]t has always been widely understood that the Second 
Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a pre-existing right. The 
very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the 
right and declares only that it ‘shall not be infringed.’”).  The opinion further notes 
the “inherent right of self-defense has been central to the” understanding of the 
“Second Amendment right.”  Id. at 628. 
25. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
26. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, NATO MC 362/1, NATO 
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (2003) [hereinafter NATO ROE]. 
27. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-0, OPERATIONS 3-3 (2008) 
(emphasis added). 
28. Major Brett Matzenbacher, The U.S. Army and Mission Command: 
Philosophy versus Practice, MIL. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2018, at 62. 
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troops to make decisions regarding their use of force.29  Treating self-
defense differently than allied nations do also introduces a source of 
friction that can potentially hinder coalition-based operations.30  In an 
era where multinational coalitions are the norm, the interoperability of 
rules of engagement across nations becomes critically important.  The 
policy change articulated in U.S. SROE 2005 makes already delicate 
coalition operations even more fragile.   
The final reason is constitutional.  Separation of powers is a feature 
of constitutional design adopted by the founders as part of the checks 
and balances system.31  Each branch is granted specific powers which 
are both complimentary and contradictory to those of the other 
branches.  The purpose of such a power distribution is to enhance 
overall accountability by fostering internal rivalry, thus precluding a 
consolidation of power by one branch.32  Both the executive and 
legislative branches have overlapping constitutional authority relevant 
to the SROE.  The self-defense changes adopted by the executive 
branch in U.S. SROE 2005 created an ongoing conflict between the 
proper exercise of legislative and executive power.   
The argument proceeds in four parts.  Part I outlines the basic 
concepts behind self-defense and natural law, both individually and 
nationally.  Part II explicates the U.S. approach to self-defense with an 
analysis of the SROE, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), 
and state criminal law.  Part III explores individual self-defense within 
NATO military operations.  Finally, Part IV asserts that the U.S. should 
restore the right of individual self-defense to its natural prominence.  As 
a natural law right, individual self-defense is immune from regulation, 
both on and off the battlefield.  Considerations of military theory also 
 
29. Major General Werner Widder, German Army, Auftragstaktik and Innere 
Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership, MIL. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 9 (“The 
decisive foundation for Auftragstaktik is peacetime training with a deliberate focus 
on training soldiers to think independently and to act according to the superior 
commander’s intent. The superior’s specified objective, his confidence in his 
subordinates’ capabilities, his and his subordinates’ acceptance of their respective 
responsibilities, and their freedom to act are the four cornerstones of Auftragstaktik 
on the one hand and its secret on the other.”). 
30. INT’L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO HANDBOOK ON RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT 2 (2009) [hereinafter SAN REMO HANDBOOK]. 
31. See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 515, 523–526 (2015). 
32. Id. at 525–26. 
7
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inform this analysis, urging policy-makers and commanders to 
safeguard the preeminent, ancient right now under fire.  Moreover, in 
fundamentally altering individual self-defense within the SROE, the 
executive branch may have exceeded its constitutional authority by 
creating a conflict with the broader self-defense right granted to military 
members by military criminal law.   
Sgt. Meyer is surely not the first military member to confront the 
ugly side of the changes announced in U.S. SROE 2005.  Nor will he 
be the last.  Unfortunately, others may not be as fortunate.  In claiming 
the right of self-defense for themselves, and sometimes defying orders 
to do it, they risk committing a crime.  Servicemembers should not face 
so cruel a choice.   
I.  “THE FIRST LAW OF OUR NATURE”:33  NATURAL LAW, INDIVIDUAL 
SELF-DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SELF-DEFENSE 
In the twenty-first century, natural law is relegated to the 
backwoods of scholarly and professional debate.  Nothing is more 
“unfashionable” than predicating a legal argument upon natural law 
concepts.34  But, to borrow from Professor Noah Feldman, the 
“possibility of a natural duty to obey at least some just laws, regardless 
of association with a political entity that enacted them, is not as outré 
as it might at first sound.”35   
Indeed, natural law “continues to lurk beneath the surface” of 
modern law.36  It is underappreciated, but not eliminated.  This part 
sketches the role natural law plays in the modern legal world through 
the prism of the archetypical natural law right: self-defense.   
 
33. Letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster (July 28, 1842), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp. 
34. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1058 (2007) 
(book review). 
35. Id. at 1059. 
36. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2006); see also 
Stephen C. Neff, A Short History of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 12, 
17 (3d ed., Malcolm D. Evans 2010). 
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A.  Overview of Natural Law: Past & Present 
Natural law is law that stems from logic and moral reasoning rather 
than the decisions of a political community.37  The concept is perhaps 
best described as “the view that there are a number of true directives of 
human reason that every person can easily formulate for himself.”38  
Certain “natural inclinations” are so basic to humanity that they are, and 
must be, “recognized as law.”39  These principles of “right and wrong” 
are “fixed and universal; they do not change depending upon political 
inclinations or cultural predispositions.”40  
Natural law has a rich history.  Its early formulation is traceable to 
the mind of Aristotle, who described two classes of law: civil law, 
which was “just because enacted,” and natural law, which was “enacted 
because just.”41  Ancient Romans imported this concept into the empire, 
believing every society held certain principles in common.42  Stoic 
writers stretched the idea even further.43  To them, the globe was but 
one “‘world city-state’ (or kosmopolis) governed by the law of 
nature.”44  Writing in this period, Cicero memorably described natural 
law, as something   
not written, but born with us—which we have not learned, or 
received by tradition, or read, but which we have taken and sucked 
in and imbibed from nature herself; a law which not taught, but to 
which we were made—which we were not trained in, but which is 
ingrained in us . . . .45  
 
37. See Major John J. Merriam, Natural Law and Self-Defense, 206 MIL. L. 
REV. 43, 47 (2010) (describing natural law as a “rule of human reason”). 
38. Ralph McInerny, The Principles of Natural Law, 25 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 2 
(1980).   
39. Thomas E. Davitt, St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law, in ORIGINS OF 
THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 39–40 (Arthur L. Harding ed., 1954). 
40. MURPHY, supra note 36, at 10. 
41. Albert Broderick, The Radical Middle: Natural Right of Property in Aquinas 
and the Popes, in NATURAL LAW 175 (ed. John Finnis, 1991). 
42. Neff, supra note 36, at 5. 
43. See id. 
44. Id. 
45. ASCONIUS PEDANIUS, ON CICERO’S PRO MILONE (John Paul Adams trans., 
1996), available at http://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/asconius.htm. 
9
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Later, during the tumultuous Middle Ages, Catholic thinkers took 
up the interpretative baton for application of natural law concepts.46  
Thomas Aquinas developed a theory of natural law that brought 
intellectual rigidity to an otherwise ephemeral concept.  All law, he 
reasoned, is based on the principle that “good ought to be done and 
pursued and that evil ought to be avoided.”47  Natural law consists of a 
set of principles that effectuate these ends.  Aquinas defined “goods” 
broadly and objectively, as goals that “all men” would accept.48  One 
essential good was that of self-preservation.49  No inclination is stronger 
than the desire to preserve one’s own life.  From this principle, Aquinas 
developed intricate theories of self-defense for individuals and of just 
wars for political collectives.50   
Spurred by Aquinas’ work, natural law flourished.  In the next 
epoch of natural law thought, scholars writing in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries began to factor in state practice alongside natural 
law principles.51  Dutchmen Hugo Grotius—often referred to as the 
father of international law—led the charge, applying and expanding 
Aquinas’ rationalistic conception of natural law to the law of nations.52  
Much like Aquinas, Grotius viewed natural law as rooted in logic, 
labeling it the “dictate of right reason . . . .”53  Beginning there, Grotius 
put flesh on natural law’s then-slender bones, presenting a 
comprehensive body of international law in a momentous work, De 
 
46. See Neff, supra note 36, at 6 (“The European Middle Ages became the great 
age of natural-law thought.”). 
47. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. 1.2.94, art. 2., quoted 
in THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW: THE COMPLETE TEXT (Alfred J. Freddoso 
trans., St. Augustine’s Press 2009). 
48. Merriam, supra note 37, at 50. 
49. Id. 
50. See id. 
51. Professor Neff helpfully notes that this period should not be viewed as one 
of increasing “secularization of natural-law thought.” See Neff, supra note 36, at 8.  
Rather, “[n]atural law itself was (and had always been) primarily secular in nature.” 
Id. Professor Neff’s cautionary note suggests that critics should not be so quick to 
attack natural law as a purely parochial creation. 
52. See id. at 9. 
53. Merriam, supra note 37, at 55 (quoting DAVID J. HILL, Introduction to Hugo 
Grotius, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 11 (A.C. Campbell ed. & trans., M. Walter 
Dunne Publ. 1901)). 
10
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Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), published in 
1625.54   
In the centuries after Grotius, following the rise of the Westphalian 
system of sovereign principalities in 1648,55 scholars and statesmen 
began to value state practice over natural-law concepts.56  International 
lawyers confronted a crucial “riddle: How can there be law among 
sovereigns when sovereignty, by definition admits no higher 
authority?”57  Natural law could not produce a satisfying answer.58  If 
states were truly sovereign, no amount of logic or “right reason” could 
bind them.59  This thesis breathed new life into the positive theory of 
law, centered on the idea that consent alone can bind a sovereign state.60  
Positivist theory draws from private contract law principles to propose 
agreements govern the conduct of states, just as they govern the conduct 
of individuals.61  Scholars began to view international law as an 
“outgrowth or feature of the will of the States of the world,” rather than 
an overarching, moralizing framework.62  In this view, law was a 
servant of states, and no longer a master.63   
 
54. See Neff, supra note 36, at 9. For an explanation of Grotius’ enduring 
impact, see Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 1 (1946). 
55. The precise date in question is 1648, which marked the end of the Thirty 
Years War in the Treaty of Westphalia.  The treaty “acknowledge[ed] the sovereign 
authority of various European princes,” and is generally recognized as the inception 
of modern international law.”  Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2607 (1997). 
56. See Neff, supra note 36, at 12–14. 
57. David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of 
an Illusion, 17 QUINNIPIAC L.R. 99, 113 (1998). 
58. See id. 
59. See Koh, supra note 55, at 2606. 
60. Positivism is not a recent development, but its ascendancy is. See generally 
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 164–85 (2d ed., 
1958). 
61. See id. (“International legal positivism is simply the working out of the 
private law metaphor of contract applied to a public legal order.”).  See also Koh, 
supra note 55, at 2608 (“Sovereign states functioned as the chief actors within the 
system.”). 
62. Neff, supra note 36, at 9. 
63. See id. at 15. 
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Ideas of sovereignty did not alone contribute to the rise of 
positivism.  Spurred by Enlightenment-Age gains in knowledge, 
nineteenth century scholars also became fixated upon applying 
scientific concepts to jurisprudence.64  The scientific emphasis upon 
observable phenomenon and rigid analysis necessarily eschewed areas 
which were based upon “conjecture,” religion and morality among 
them.65  This new outlook left natural law adrift.  Natural law ideas 
were too closely associated with moralistic ideas of right and wrong to 
find a home in the scientific arena.66  Meanwhile, positivism flourished 
under this new regime because its primary subjects, custom and state 
practice, were susceptible to the type of exacting analysis seen in the 
natural sciences.67  Accordingly, both customary law and “state practice 
came to be seen as primary sources of the law of nations,” even as they 
“largely mirrored and ratified state conduct.”68   
It was a seismic legal shift.  In the span of little more than two 
centuries—the nineteenth and twentieth—positive law largely 
displaced two millennia of natural law jurisprudence.69  When modern 
lawyers examine the puzzle of international institutions and treaty 
regimes, they see a legal universe built upon positivism, not natural law.  
The post-World War II international system reaches nearly every aspect 
of human activity.70  Specialized treaty regimes govern global 
economics, diplomatic relations, and even war—developments 
unthinkable only two hundred years ago.  Enacted laws create and fuel 
these mechanisms.  The wispy dreams of natural law theorists seem 
unnecessary in their wake.   
Beyond its apparent irrelevance, several other biting complaints 
can be lodged against natural law.  First, its overt reliance upon right 
and wrong seems incongruous with an age of rationalism.71  Natural 
law “seems metaphysical or at least vaguely religious. In any case it 
 
64. See Stephen Hall, The Persistent Spectre: Natural Law, International Order 
and the Limits of Legal Positivism, 12 EUROPEAN J. INT’L. L. 269, 277 (2001). 
65. Id. 
66. See id. at 278–79. 
67. Id. at 277. 
68. Koh, supra note 55, at 2608. 
69. Hall, supra note 64, at 270. 
70. See Koh, supra note 55, at 2614. 
71. See, e.g., Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American 
Tradition, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2010). 
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seems plainly wrong.”72  Second, natural law lacks the clarity and 
consistency of positive law.  What appears “logical” to one person will 
appear illogical to another.  Thus, “right reason” alone cannot govern 
as law.  One need only examine the works of natural law theorists—all 
of whom discovered new and different principles—to find evidence of 
its elasticity.  Third, because of its lack of clarity, adhering to natural 
law is an invitation for abuse by judges and politicians alike.73  In the 
U.S., critics of natural law find evidence of its excesses in the Supreme 
Court case Lochner v. New York, in which the majority “invalidated an 
employment law on the grounds that it violated a substantive due 
process right to ‘liberty of contract.’”74   
So serious are these critiques, and so triumphant is positivism, that 
most attorneys assume natural law no longer exists.  It comes as no 
surprise then, in the words of Professor Ronald Dworkin, that “no one 
wants to be called a natural lawyer.”75  But, while there may be few 
natural lawyers left, natural law persists.  In fact, it is “surviving rather 
better than has generally been appreciated.”76  Natural law can be 
difficult to find, however, because it usually appears in camouflage.77  
One example of natural law’s continuing survival lies in international 
economics.  Though not immediately obvious, the modern international 
economic structure—with its abundance of transnational interactions—
owes its existence to natural law’s emphasis on shared human 
community not confined to national boundaries.78 
In the U.S., natural law continues its creeping influence upon 
Supreme Court decisions, even in the post-Lochner era.  Substantive 
due process decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas,79 which based a right 
 
72. Ronald A. Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165 
(1982). 
73. See O’Scannlain, supra note 71, at 1515. 
74. See id. at 1516. 
75. Dworkin, supra note 72, at 165. 
76. Neff, supra note 36, at 17; see also MURPHY, supra note 36, at 10; Feldman, 
supra note 34, at 1058 (“[V]estiges of natural law theory may be found in various 
places in our legal universe.”). 
77. Neff, supra note 36, at 18 (“One reason that natural-law ideas were not 
always recognizable was that, to some extent, they were re-clothed into a materialistic 
and scientific garb.”). 
78. See id. 
79. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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“to be free from prohibitions on consensual same-sex conduct in an 
account of human functioning,” rely upon implicit application of 
natural law.80  Indeed, the modern Court defines liberty in terms 
strikingly reminiscent of Aquinas and Grotius: “At the heart of liberty 
is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”81  Just as natural law seems 
to influence judicial decisions, some assert it also retains continued 
relevance in forming an “understanding of the Constitution’s original 
meaning.”82  The U.S. Declaration of Independence unequivocally 
references natural law,83 proclaiming “the Laws of Nature and of 
Nature’s God” provide the right to rebel against English rule.84  
In international law, certain schools of thought still draw upon 
natural law principles.  The New Haven School of International Law, 
for instance, is “an entirely secular theory of law but . . . takes the 
perspective long associated with natural law, that of the decision 
maker.”  Its goals—to apply policy in “ways that maintain community 
order and, simultaneously, achieve the best possible approximation of 
the community’s social goals” 85—resemble Aristotle’s formulation of 
natural law as seeking public good.  Certain doctrines also utilize 
natural law principles.  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P in 
popular parlance) espouses a duty for states to intervene to prevent or 
alleviate humanitarian crises.  Referenced in a 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document following a high-level meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly,86 the doctrine draws strength from “the 
 
80. Feldman, supra note 34, at 1058 n. 146; see also Davin J. Hall, Not So 
Landmark After All? Lawrence v. Texas: Classical Liberalism and Due Process 
Jurisprudence, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 617, 620 (2004). 
81. Feldman, supra note 34, at 1058 n.146 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
82. O’Scannlain, supra note 71, at 1515. 
83. Id. at 1515–16. 
84. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
85. W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of International 
Law, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANN. MEETING (AM. SOCIETY INT’L LAW) 188, 120 
(1992). For a similarly helpful perspective, see Iaian Scobbie, Wicked Heresies or 
Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 71–
72 (3d ed., Malcolm D. Evans). 
86. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, at 30 (Sept. 16, 2005) 
(“Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . The international 
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resurgence of natural law principles,” namely the fusion of law, policy, 
and morality.87  In this view, sovereignty includes a predicate 
responsibility to protect one’s people; failing to meet this baseline 
responsibility deprives a state of its sovereign rights and justifies 
outside intervention.88  This “normative concept of sovereignty” finds 
good company in natural law.89  
Other facets of international law even more closely resemble 
natural law.  Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell maintains that one 
familiar source of international law—jus cogens—is explainable only 
by natural law theory.90  Defined in Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, jus cogens refers to “peremptory 
norm[s] . . . from which no derogation is permitted and which can only 
be modified by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character.”91  Positivists will take careful note of that last 
clause.  Positive laws cannot override jus cogens, but jus cogens can 
supersede positive laws.   
Jus cogens tend to involve ethical or moral norms almost 
exclusively,92 with the most prominent examples being prohibitions on 
genocide, slavery, and torture.93  Operating much like the public policy 
doctrine in contract law, jus cogens can be used to void existing 
agreements based upon a judicial finding that such agreements 
contradict an overarching public good.94  Not knowing how to label jus 
 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility . . . .”). 
87. Silva D. Kantareva, The Responsibility to Protect: Issues of Legal 
Formulation and Practical Application, 6 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 1, 1 (2011); see 
also Beth Van Schaack, “The Grass that Gets Trampled When Elephants Fight:” Will 
the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 327, 376 (2010). 
88. See Schaack, supra note 87, at 376. 
89. Id. 
90. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Jus Cogens: International Law’s Higher Ethical 
Norms, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (Donald Earl Childress 
III ed., 2012). 
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
92. O’Connell, supra note 90, at 79. 
93. For a list of likely jus cogens norms, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
94. O’Connell, supra note 90, at 83–88. 
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cogens, some scholars have taken to calling it “super customary law” 
or even “normative positivism.”95  Professor O’Connell, however, 
maintains that positivism wholly fails to explain jus cogens because 
these norms operate completely outside the requirement of state 
consent.96  While customs only become law when states adhere to them 
out of a sense of legal obligation, jus cogens norms exist 
independently.97  These norms translate the most basic protections of 
human dignity into a form of “super law,” not voidable by international 
agreements.  We have only one theory to explain such a phenomenon: 
natural law.98  Professor O’Connell postulates that judges asked to 
enforce jus cogens should apply natural law principles, examining 
positive law sources for evidence “about the international community’s 
highest ethical norms” which might merit recognition as a peremptory 
norm.99  Whatever the method used to define jus cogens, they are 
inexplicable on grounds other than natural law.  As Hersch Lauterpacht 
put it, jus cogens and other modern international law principles are the 
“more articulate expressions of the law of nature which nurtured the 
growth of international law and which assisted powerfully in its 
development.”100  
If natural law is still salient in the modern world, what value does 
it offer?  The most striking example of its utility comes from examining 
the effects of its absence.  In pre-World War II Germany, jurists wholly 
embraced the promise of legal positivism, believing it  
was the only theory of law that could claim to be “scientific” in an 
Age of Science.  Dissenters from this view were characterized by 
positivists with that epithet modern man fears above all others: 
“naïve.” The result was that it could be reported by 1927 that “to be 
 
95. Id. at 83. 
96. Id. (“Jus cogens norms are norms apart from and above the rules and 
principles derived from the primary, positivist sources of international law, including 
customary international law.”). 
97. Id. (noting “Jus cogens norms do not depend on consent.”). 
98. Id. at 93. 
99. Id. at 93–94. 
100. Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law—The General Part (1954), 
reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT 52 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1975) (noting that various international legal 
rules pertain “not to an ascertained direct expression of the will of States, but to the 
reason of the thing”). 
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found guilty of adherence to natural law theories is a kind of social 
disgrace.”101 
Adherents divorced the law from any conception of morality.102  Law 
became whatever the government enacted—nothing more, nothing less.  
Such blind faith in the law may have propelled the legal community to 
turn a blind eye to the rise of the Nazis.  Hitler, of course, “did not come 
to power by a violent revolution.”103  His first assaults on the country 
“were on ramparts which, if they were manned by anyone, were manned 
by lawyers and judges.”104   
This is not to say, of course, that positivism produces radical 
political philosophy or dictatorship.  Within its sphere, positivism 
encourages a healthy attention to the words of the law and the intentions 
of its makers.  But, like anything, it can be taken too far, especially 
when long-recognized rights or traditions are involved.  
Next, we move to an examination of two similar yet distinct 
concepts saturated with natural law principles: individual and national 
self-defense.  
B.  Individual Self-Defense 
Perhaps no legal canon enjoys deeper historical roots than the 
doctrine of individual self-defense.  It is “Nature’s eldest law” and, as 
such, the prototypical natural law right.105  The right owes itself more 
to psychology and evolution than law.  When Cicero spoke of natural 
law as “not written, but born with us,” he was specifically referring to 
the law of self-defense.106  In his words, “if our life be in danger from 
. . . open violence or from the weapons of robbers or enemies, every 
 
101. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart 
(1958), in LAW AND MORALITY: READINGS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 67, 93 (David 
Dyzenhaus, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau, & Arthur Ripstein, eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
102. Id. at 94. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. JOHN DRYDEN, ABSALOM AND ACHITOPHEL (J.T. & W. Davis 1682). 
106. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ORATION FOR TITUS ANNIUS MILO ch. IV, 
available at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.02.0020:text=Mil.:
chapter=4&highlight=not+written%2C (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
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means of securing our safety is honourable.”107  A corollary from 
Cicero’s conclusion is that states do not create the right of self-defense; 
they merely protect it.  John Locke, whose writing profoundly shaped 
Anglo-American political philosophy, agreed self-defense is a “pre-
political” right that exists independently of sovereign states.108  Even if 
society disintegrated, the necessity to defend oneself against attack is 
so intrinsic to human functioning that it must be observed.  Locke 
viewed this inclination in terms similar to Cicero, as reflecting nothing 
less than a “fundamental law of nature.”109   
A terse historical examination illustrates the extent to which the 
right of self-defense is embedded in law and culture.  The earliest 
Western civilization, ancient Athens, recognized a right of self-
defense,110 as did the ancient Hebrews.111  The Romans likewise 
honored the principle that “it is permissible to repel force by force,” 
which they viewed as “conferred by nature.”112  Importantly, the right 
belonged to “all persons,” not solely to male landowners.113  With this 
firm foundation in positive and natural law, self-defense would survive 
the fall of the Roman Empire and play an especially prominent role in 
the writing of later scholars.   
Catholic scholar Thomas Aquinas, writing in the Roman natural 
law tradition, saw self-defense as the central natural law right because 
the desire for self-preservation is “man’s strongest inclination.”114  
Consequently, natural law recognized and protected the right to take 
 
107. Id. 
108. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 449, 449 (2008). 
109. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., 1980). 
110. David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 43, 104–05 (2007) [hereinafter Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense]. 
111. See id. at 106; see also Exodus 22:2 (“If a thief is caught breaking in at 
night and is struck a fatal blow, the defender is not guilty of bloodshed; but if it 
happens after sunrise, the defender is guilty of bloodshed.”). 
112. Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 116 n.22 
(citing DIG. 43.16.1.27 (Ulpian, Edict 69)). 
113. See Will Tysse, The Roman Legal Treatment of Self Defense and the 
Private Possession of Weapons in the Codex Justinianus, 16 J. FIREARMS & PUB. 
POL’Y 163, 165 (2004). 
114. Merriam, supra note 37, at 50. 
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another’s life when necessary to preserve one’s own.115  Any law that 
transgressed these principles was “no longer a law, but a corruption of 
law.”116   
Like Aquinas, Hugo Grotius recognized self-defense as stemming 
from humanity’s inherent desire for self-preservation.117  Referencing 
both Aquinas and Roman law, Grotius proposed that if one’s life were 
in danger, “he may not only make War upon, but very justly destroy the 
Aggressor . . . .”118  Grotius further referred to individual self-defense 
as “Private War,” and used its essential principles to deduce a set of 
principles that justified war between nations, which he labeled “Public 
War.”119   
Later natural law scholars built from this cornerstone.  Samuel 
Pufendorf, writing only decades after Grotius and soon after the Peace 
of Westphalia, emphasized the necessity of self-defense by imagining 
the effects of its absence.  Were people forbidden from defending 
themselves, even when “pursued by Force,” the resulting state of affairs 
“would be so far from promoting the Peace, that it would rather 
contribute to the Ruin and Destruction of Mankind.”120  Without self-
defense, humans would be unable to interact with each other.  For that 
reason, Pufendorf designated self-defense as “the foundation of 
civilized society.”121   
Following Pufendorf’s lead, Emerich de Vattel discussed self-
defense at length in his influential work, The Law of Nations, or The 
Principles of Law Applied to the Conduct and the Affairs of Nations and 
 
115. Id. at 52; see also AQUINAS, supra note 47, pt. II.2.64, art. 7 (“Therefore 
this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it 
is natural to everything to keep itself in ‘being,’ as far as possible.”). 
116.  AQUINAS, supra note 47, pt. I.2.95, art. 2. 
117. Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 76–77 (As 
Grotius observed, even human babies, like animals, have an instinct to defend 
themselves.”). 
118. GROTIUS, supra note 23, at 397. 
119. Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 77. 
120. SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS: EIGHT 
BOOKS 184 (The Lawbook Exchange, Inc. 2007) (1672) . 
121. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense, supra note 22, at 242. 
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of Sovereigns.122  The title betrays his fidelity to the natural law.  Vattel 
took the notion of self-defense a step further than his intellectual 
predecessors.  He advanced the idea that, far from being simply 
permissive, self-preservation (and self-defense, by logical extension), 
is an “obligation imposed by nature, and no man can entirely and 
absolutely renounce it.”123   
While Vattel’s belief in the obligatory nature of self-defense is not 
widely adhered to in modern times, self-defense itself continues to be 
enormously pervasive.  In fact, “self-defense is part of the law of every 
legal system in the world today.”124  Few other legal concepts, if any, 
have been so widely adopted.  Indeed, self-defense is so deeply etched 
into the world’s legal codes that it likely constitutes a “general principle 
of law,” capable of enforcement by the International Court of Justice as 
an exclusion to criminal liability.125   
In the U.S., as in many other countries,126 the right to bear arms is 
protected in the Constitution.127  In interpreting this right, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found the “inherent right of self-defense” is “central to 
the Second Amendment right” to possess weapons.128  The majority 
examined natural law sources in finding the Amendment effectuated 
what Blackstone referred to as “the right of having and using arms for 
self-preservation and defence.”129  As the above examination made 
clear, Blackstone drew from the deep well of natural law thought to 
make his pronouncement and the U.S. Supreme Court—knowingly or 
unknowingly—drew from the same in its decision.   
Treaty law also contains provisions reminiscent of the natural law 
right to self-defense.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
 
122. EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2015) (1833). 
123. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
124. Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 137. 
125. See generally John Cerone, Is There a Human Right of Self-Defense?, 2 J. 
L. ECON. & POL’Y 319, 328–29 (2006) (acknowledging that self-defense may be 
recognized as a general principle of law, even if it is probably only an exclusion to 
criminal liability and not a positive right). 
126. Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 137. 
127. See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
128. D.C. v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (emphasis added). 
129. Id. at 594. 
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Rights (“ICCPR”) guarantees the “inherent right to life” to every human 
being, adding that the right “shall be protected by law,” preventing 
arbitrary deprivations.130  As Vattel discussed, the right to life must 
necessarily include the right to protect one’s own life.131  Self-
preservation, in other words, entails a right of self-defense.  The 
European Convention on Human Rights takes the ICCPR’s language a 
step further, providing that action taken “in defence of any person from 
unlawful violence” shall not be regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of 
the right to life.132  In a section entitled “General Principles of Criminal 
Law,” the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute likewise 
excludes from criminal liability those who “act[ed] reasonably to 
defend himself or herself or another person . . . .”133   
Individual self-defense continues to boast a remarkable level of 
influence on the modern legal universe.  The concept continues to be 
“the first law of our nature,” and, accordingly, it “must be recognized 
by every code which professes to regulate the condition and relations 
of man.”134  Its continued saliency explains why the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East, in adjudicating war crimes following 
World War II, pronounced “[a]ny law, international or municipal, 
which prohibits recourse to force, is necessarily limited by the right of 
self-defense.”135  
 
130. U.N. Gen. Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 
1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992). 
131. See generally VATTEL, supra note 122, at 22. 
132. Human Rights Act, 1998, Art. II(2)(a) (Eng.). 
133. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 31(1)(c), U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.183/9 (1998). 
134. Letter from Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster (July 28, 1842), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp. 
135. In re Hirota and Others, 15 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF  PUB. INT’L  L. CASES 356, 
364 (Int’l Mil. Trib. For the Far East, 1948) (no. 118, Tokyo trial).  Interestingly, 
Yoram Dinstein notes the Tribunal’s comment “may have always been true in regard 
to domestic law, and it is currently accurate also in respect of international law,” even 
as he suggests it is wiser to avoid such “axiomatic” statements. YORAM DINSTEIN, 
WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 170 (2d ed. 1994). 
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C.  National Self-Defense 
From the idea of individual self-defense, philosophers and 
statesmen extrapolated the notion of national self-defense.136  If an 
individual could act in self-defense, so too could a state.  In this way, 
the “law of nature” governing individual self-defense became the “law 
of nations” when applied to the international system.137  Early 
formulations of national self-defense were broad and lacking in strict 
regulation.  In Roman times, priests known as the jus fetiale were 
charged with ensuring that any recourse to force satisfied certain basic 
requirements, lest the use of force be unjust.138  Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the requirements were not especially demanding.  The 
priests mandated the state issue a formal demand for satisfaction of 
grievances followed by a formal declaration of war if such demand went 
unmet.139  They also appeared to possess some authority to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the grievance justifying the conflict.140  
Centuries later, St. Augustine crafted a theory of just war, fusing 
Christian philosophy with the baseline of legality provided by Roman 
law.141  In his view, war existed not only to right wrongs, but also to 
enforce justice.142  St. Augustine’s theories were more philosophical 
than legal, establishing outlines of legality without specifying exacting 
 
136. See Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 82; see 
also KINGA TIBORI SZABO, ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN SELF-DEFENCE: ESSENCE AND 
LIMITS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2011) (noting this idea is “in line with the 
practice of ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, who regarded the community as 
the completion of the self”). 
137. Kopel, The Human Right of Self-Defense, supra note 110, at 82. 
138.  GERALD IRVING ANTHONY DARE DRAPER, REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND 
ARMED CONFLICTS: THE SELECTED WORKS ON THE LAWS OF WAR BY THE LATE 
PROFESSOR COLONEL G.I.A.D. DRAPER, OBE 5–6 (Michael A. Meyer & Hilaire 
McCoubrey eds., Kluwer Law Int’l, 1998). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (noting the jus fetiale would assess the moral and religious basis for 
conflict but ultimate authority for whether to pursue military action belonged to the 
Roman Senate). 
141. Robert J. Delahuty & John Yoo, From Just War to False Peace, 13 CHI. J. 
INT’L. L. 1, 10–11 (2012) (noting “St. Augustine’s approach justified a broader scope 
to war than existed for Cicero” in Roman times); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 135, 
at 62. 
142. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 141, at 11. 
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss2/3
Bengs camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2020  9:26 AM 
2020] SELF-DEFENSE UNDER SIEGE 359 
requirements before states could resort to war.143  St. Thomas refined 
Augustine’s theories, postulating that uses of force must fulfill three 
predicate conditions: (1) war was invoked and prosecuted by a “public 
authority;” (2) in order to seek the just cause of “punishing 
wrongdoers”; (3) with the specific “intent of securing peace and helping 
the good or avoiding evil.”144   
Natural law theorists writing in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries—including the jurisprudential giants Grotius, Pufendorf, and 
Vattel—generally accepted and expanded on this theory, using it to 
formulate specific causes justifying warfare.145  Self-defense was not 
required.  While all agreed only just wars were legitimate, “justice” 
seemed to be in the eye of the beholder.146  To name only one example, 
famed Spanish theorist Vitoria sanctified Spain’s conquest of the 
Americas, reasoning the native “Indians had violated the fundamental 
rights of the Spaniards to travel freely among them, to carry on trade 
and to propagate Christianity.”147   
Perhaps due to the malleable nature of these restraints, the rules on 
just warfare became little more than a parchment barrier, affecting state 
rhetoric more than reality.148  Two trends would help stem this tide, at 
least to some extent: (1) the rise of customary international law 
principles restricting states’ recourse to force, which was later 
supplemented by (2) binding positive law in the form of the U.N. 
Charter.   
Customary international law rules on self-defense gained their 
shape in a diplomatic incident known as the Caroline affair.149  During 
an 1837 rebellion in British-controlled Canada, rebels occupied an 
island on the “Canadian side of the Niagara River.”150  American 
sympathizers used the steamboat Caroline to ferry supplies from the 
 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 14. 
145. DINSTEIN, supra note 135, at 63–64. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 64. 
148. Cf. id. at 166. 
149. See generally John E. Noyes, The Caroline: International Law Limits on 
Resort to Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 263 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. 
Dickinson, & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007). 
150. DINSTEIN, supra note 135, at 227. 
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American side to the island.151  This practice continued despite official 
British complaints.  Diplomacy having failed, British troops traveled to 
the American side, set the Caroline on fire, and sent it barreling over 
Niagara Falls, killing several Americans in the process.152  Incensed, 
U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster registered an official complaint 
with the British.  His British counterpart, Lord Ashburton, justified the 
attack on grounds of self-defense.  Webster disagreed, arguing self-
defense may only be invoked when there is a “necessity of self-defence, 
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.”153  Further, forces acting in self-defense must do “nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of 
self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within 
it.”154  After extended correspondence, the British conceded their stance 
on the matter.  Mr. Webster’s contentions built upon earlier restraints 
on self-defense developed by just war and natural law theorists.  For his 
part, Lord Ashuburton did not contest that self-defense, even in the 
international sphere, “is the first law of our nature . . . .”155  “[O]f this 
great general principle,” he wrote, “we seem to be agreed.”156   
From this correspondence arose the two primary restraints on 
defensive measures now accepted as customary international law.157  
First, actions taken in self-defense must be necessary, meaning “no 
alternative response be possible.”158  Second, defensive measures must 
adhere to the principle of proportionality, which mandates that the scale 
and intensity of armed responses “be limited by the necessity” that 




153. Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox, British Minister to Washington 




157. See Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the Scope of Self-Defense in 
International Law, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 162 (2011). 
158. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 150 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
159. Letter from Daniel Webster to Henry Fox, British Minister to Washington 
(Apr. 24, 1841),  
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Positive treaty law, in the form of the U.N. Charter, operates 
alongside these customary principles.  Housed in a chapter outlining the 
“Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,” Article 2 of the 
Charter forbids states from resorting to “the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state 
. . . .”160  These words do not tell the complete story.  Article 51 carves 
out a major exception by announcing that “nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs . . . until the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.”161  Notable within that provision is the use of a term familiar 
to natural law theorists: inherent.  This word does not appear by 
accident.  According to Professor Yoram Dinstein, this “choice of 
words has overtones of jus naturale, which appears to be the fount of 
the right to self-defence.”162  In this way, modern positive law not only 
references but explicitly invokes its natural law roots.  The International 
Court of Justice grappled with this language in its well-known decision 
in Nicaragua v. United States of America.163  Adjudicating a dispute 
involving U.S. sponsorship of rebel groups in Nicaraguan territory, the 
Court noted Article 51—consisting of all of 101 words—cannot begin 
to cover the entirety of the law governing “the use of force in 
international relations.”164  The Court thus found: 
Article 51 of the charter is only meaningful on the basis that there is 
a “natural” or “inherent” right of self-defence, and it is hard to see 
how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present 
content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter.165  
 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp; see also GRAY, 
supra note 158, at 150 (noting “proportionality relates to the size, duration and target 
of the response”). 
160. U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4. 
161. Id. at art. 51. 
162. DINSTEIN, supra note 135, at 179. 
163. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
164. Id. at 94. 
165. Id. 
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By customary international law, the Court appeared primarily to 
articulate the rules on proportionality and necessity derived from the 
Caroline affair.  
As a result, even in the international sphere, one hears the echoes 
of natural law in the focus on inherent rights—those that derive not 
from statute but from structure and primordial values.  It is a lesson that 
gains newfound relevance in the following examination of self-defense 
in the battlespace.  
II.  U.S. APPLICATION OF SELF-DEFENSE 
The rules of engagement (“ROE”) provide guidance for 
interactions between U.S. military members in a battlespace and enemy 
personnel.  Although provisions within the ROE vary by conflict and 
theater of operation, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction 
3121.01, Standing Rules Of Engagement for U.S. Forces (“SROE”) 
provides unifying, foundational guidance.166  The SROE explain the 
various types of self-defense U.S. forces may lawfully act upon, to 
include: national,167 collective,168 unit,169 and individual170 self-
defense.   
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress sole authority “[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
 
166. See generally U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14; U.S. SROE 2000, supra 
note 15. 
167. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 3(b) (“Defense of 
the United States, U.S. forces, and, in certain circumstances, U.S. persons and their 
property, and/or U.S. commercial assets from a hostile act or demonstration of hostile 
intent.”). 
168. Id. at enclosure A, para. 3(c) (“Defense of designated non-U.S. military 
forces and/or designated foreign nationals and their property from a hostile act or 
demonstrated hostile intent.  Only the President or SecDef may authorize collective 
self-defense.”). 
169. Compare id. at enclosure A, para. 3(a) (“Unit commanders always retain 
the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile 
act or demonstrated hostile intent”), with U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure 
A, para. 7(c) (“A unit commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary 
means available and to take all appropriate actions to defend the unit, including 
elements and personnel, or other US forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or 
demonstrated hostile intent.”) 
170. Individual self-defense is only enumerated separately in U.S. SROE 2000, 
supra note 15. 
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Forces.”171  At the same time, however, the Constitution names the 
President as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States.”172  It is ultimately unclear whether SROE are best considered 
as promulgated under a statutory grant of authority from Congress,173 
under the President’s Commander in Chief authority, or a mixture of 
both. 
A.  Self-Defense in the SROE 
Before beginning any discussion of the current self-defense 
standards, it is important to note U.S. SROE 2005 incorporated 
significant revisions to the concept of individual self-defense compared 
to the preceding version, U.S. SROE 2000.  Moreover, U.S. SROE 2005 
is purportedly undergoing another round of revisions for future 
implementation, so the right of individual self-defense may soon be 
further amended.174 
The stated purpose of the SROE provides valuable insight 
regarding the perception and status of self-defense as a legal concept 
within the promulgating entity, the U.S. Department of Defense.  The 
distinct differences between the purpose statements in U.S. SROE 2000 
and U.S. SROE 2005 demonstrate a fundamental shift from self-
defense as an individual’s constant, natural law right to a malleable, 
positive law grant from the sovereign.  U.S. SROE 2000 states: “The 
purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation guidance on the 
application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the 
inherent right and obligation of self-defense.”175  In contrast, U.S. 
SROE 2005 states: “[t]he purpose of the SROE is to provide 
implementation guidance on the application of force for mission 
accomplishment and the exercise of self-defense.”176  Thus, according 
to the U.S. Department of Defense, self-defense was not only an 
 
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
172. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
173. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 101–499 (2017). 
174. See U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14 (noting “the current SROE is under 
revision”). 
175. U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para. 1(a) (emphasis 
added). 
176. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 1(a). 
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inherent right between 2000 and 2005, but an obligation.  After 2005, 
self-defense apparently lost its status as either a right or an obligation. 
The substantive difference between individual self-defense in U.S. 
SROE 2000 and U.S. SROE 2005 is even more striking.  U.S. SROE 
2000 defines individual self-defense as: 
The inherent right to use all necessary means available and to take 
all appropriate actions to defend oneself and US forces in one’s 
vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent is a unit of 
self-defense. Commanders have the obligation to ensure that 
individuals within their respective units understand and are trained 
on when and how to use force in self-defense.177 
U.S. SROE 2005 no longer contains a separate definition of individual 
self-defense.  Instead, the inherent right of self-defense is collectively 
defined: 
Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to 
exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated 
hostile intent.  Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander as 
detailed below, military members may exercise individual self-
defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.  
When individuals are assigned and acting as part of a unit, individual 
self-defense should be considered a subset of unit self-defense.  As 
such, unit commanders may limit individual self-defense by 
members of their unit.  Both unit and individual self-defense includes 
defense of other US military forces in the vicinity.178   
Thus, self-defense was transformed from a recognized individual right 
existing concurrent with a group right into a subordinate component of 
a group right subject to veto by the unit commander. 
While U.S. SROE 2005 sought to restrict individual self-defense, it 
simultaneously loosened the criteria justifying invocation of the 
concept.  U.S. SROE 2000 expressly lists the prerequisites for lawful 
invocation of self-defense: 
 
177. U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para. 5(e) (emphasis 
added). 
178. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 3(a) (emphasis 
added). 
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Application of force in self-defense requires the following two 
elements:  
(1) Necessity.  Exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force or 
terrorist(s) exhibits hostile intent.  
(2) Proportionality.  Force used to counter a hostile act or 
demonstrated hostile intent must be reasonable in intensity, duration, 
and magnitude to the perceived or demonstrated threat based on all 
facts known to the commander at the time.179 
In contrast, U.S. SROE 2005 simply provides: 
All necessary means available and all appropriate actions may be 
used in self-defense.  The following guidelines apply.   
(1) De-escalation.  When time and circumstances permit, the forces 
committing hostile acts or demonstrating hostile intent should be 
warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening. 
(2) Necessity.  Exists when a hostile act occurs or when a force 
demonstrates hostile intent.  When such conditions exist, use of force 
in self-defense is authorized while the force continues to commit 
hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent. 
(3) Proportionality.  The use of force in self-defense should be 
sufficient to respond decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of 
hostile intent.  Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity 
of the hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration and scope 
of force used should not exceed what is required.  The concept of 
proportionality in self-defense should not be confused with attempts 
to minimize collateral damage during offensive operations.180 
Nevertheless, commonalities between U.S. SROE 2000 and U.S. SROE 
2005 are readily apparent: necessity and proportionality.  U.S. SROE 
2000 also includes the concept of de-escalation, however, it lists it 
separately from necessity and proportionality.181   
The concepts of hostile act and hostile intent are important to 
understanding the application of both versions.  Fortunately, the 
definition contained in each version is substantially the same.  U.S. 
SROE 2000 provides: 
 
179. U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para. 5(f). 
180. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 4(a). 
181. See U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para. 8(a)(1). 
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Hostile Act.  An attack or other use of force against the United States, 
US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals, their 
property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US 
forces, foreign nationals and their property.  It is also force used 
directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, 
including the recovery of US personnel and vital US Government 
property. . . .182 
Hostile Intent.  The threat of imminent use of force against the United 
States, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US nationals, their 
property, US commercial assets, and/or other designated non-US 
forces, foreign nationals and their property.  Also, the threat of force 
to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, 
including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property. . . .183 
U.S. SROE 2005 offered only minor edits:  
Hostile Act.  An attack or other use of force against the United States, 
US forces or other designated persons or property.  It also includes 
force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties 
of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG 
property. . . .184 
Hostile Intent.  The threat of imminent use of force against the United 
States, US forces or other designated persons or property.  It also 
includes the threat of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or 
duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital 
USG property. . . .185 
In both versions, hostile intent requires an imminent threat.  U.S. SROE 
2005, however, adds a definition of “imminent use of force,” noting 
“[i]mminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.”186  
Rather, an imminent threat is simply one that is posed or may be posed 
at some point in the future.187 
The concept of pursuit is not one routinely considered in 
conjunction with self-defense.  Nonetheless, both SROE versions 
 
182. Id. at enclosure A, para. 5(g). 
183. Id. at enclosure A, para. 5(h). 
184. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 3(e). 
185. Id. at enclosure A, para. 3(f). 
186. Id. at enclosure A, para. 3(g). 
187. Id. 
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authorize pursuit as a component of self-defense in certain 
circumstances.  U.S. SROE 2000 states: “[s]elf-defense includes the 
authority to pursue and engage hostile forces that continue to commit 
hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent.”188  Similarly, U.S. SROE 2005 
provides “[s]elf-defense includes the authority to pursue and engage 
forces that have committed a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, 
if those forces continue to commit hostile acts or demonstrate hostile 
intent.”189  Minor differences aside, both versions expressly recognize 
a type of offensive self-defense where a retreating adversary may be 
chased in order to continue the engagement. 
B.  Self-Defense in Military Criminal Law 
Congress, acting under its authority “[t]o make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”190 adopted 
the UCMJ, which articulated the military justice system and all military 
criminal offenses.191  For U.S. military members charged with a crime 
under the UCMJ involving injury or death of another person, the scope 
and nuance of individual self-defense is enumerated within the Manual 
for Courts-Martial (“MCM”) by Rule for Courts-Martial (“RCM”) 
916;192 within Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 (“Military 
Judges’ Benchbook”);193 and within relevant case law.   
RCM 916 addresses most potential criminal defenses available to 
military members.  It expressly recognizes self-defense as falling within 
the category of a special defense.194  Special defenses do not deny 
commission of an illegal act, but instead seek to establish that the act 
was not illegal in the context of its commission.195  As a special defense, 
self-defense may be explicitly asserted by defense counsel or simply 
 
188. U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para. 8(b). 
189. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14, at enclosure A, para. 4(b). 
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
191. See UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2017). 
192. THE JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, RCM 916(a) (2008) [hereinafter MCM]. 
193. U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK 
(2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK]. 
194. Special defenses are also known as affirmative defenses. MCM, supra note 
192, RCM 916(a). 
195. Id. 
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become applicable due to evidence presented by any party.196  Indeed, 
the Military Judges’ Benchbook imposes an obligation upon military 
judges to instruct the fact-finder on self-defense, sua sponte, when the 
issue has been raised by some evidence, regardless of its credibility.197  
After self-defense is raised, however, the burden of proving its 
inapplicability rests solely on the prosecution.198  In other words, an 
accused need not specifically assert self-defense, nor prove any fact, to 
benefit from it.  Rather, the prosecution must disprove it in order to 
obtain a conviction.199 
Based upon the scope of application and the burden of proof, 
military criminal law appears to recognize and treat individual self-
defense as an inherent right.  A fact-finder’s overt legal obligation to 
consider self-defense based upon any evidence suggesting its relevance 
implies a right that exists on its own.  This interpretation is strengthened 
by the fact that an accused need not invoke self-defense in order for the 
defense to apply.  Moreover, if the prosecution must disprove self-
defense in order to obtain a conviction, the ability to defend oneself 
without committing a crime must be inherent in the fact of existence.  
This independent aspect of criminal self-defense hints at a natural law 
source. 
Self-defense contains two overlapping, component elements.  RCM 
916(e) articulates the relevant elements as follows: 
It is a defense to a homicide, assault involving deadly force, or 
battery involving deadly force that the accused:  
 
196. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(b) discussion. 
197. MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 193, at para. 5-1. 
198. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(b)(1). 
199. Another special defense unique to the military, obedience to orders, is 
worth briefly noting due to the ancillary relevance of its standard.  An accused may 
assert the fact that he was following orders as a defense to an alleged UCMJ criminal 
violation.  The key question determining applicability is whether “the accused knew 
the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and understanding would have 
known the orders to be unlawful” MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(d).  The standard 
is potentially relevant to self-defense cases if a military member is ordered not to 
defend himself when attacked in a battlespace.  Engaging the enemy in violation of 
that order could constitute a punishable violation of Articles 90, 91, or 92 of the 
UCMJ, depending upon who issued the order.  In such a situation, obedience to orders 
would not be applicable, but the defense may seek to assert the converse – 
unlawfulness of an order excessively impeding exercise of self-defense. See id. 
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(A) Apprehended, on reasonable grounds, that death or grievous 
bodily harm was about to be inflicted wrongfully on the accused; and  
(B) Believed that the force the accused used was necessary for 
protection against death or grievous bodily harm.200 
The first element is objective.  In regards to that element, a military 
judge would instruct fact-finders:  
The test here is whether, under the same facts and circumstances 
present in this case, an ordinary, prudent adult person faced with the 
same situation would have believed that there were grounds to fear 
immediate death or serious bodily harm. Because this test is 
objective, such matters as intoxication or emotional instability of the 
accused are not relevant.201 
However, objectivity of the standard is not absolute.  A military judge 
is able to qualify the standard based upon special factors such as an 
accused’s gender or age.202  The objective component equates with the 
necessity element found in both U.S. SROE 2000 and 2005.   
Although the existence of a legitimate threat is considered 
objectively, the second element defers entirely to an individual’s 
personal characteristics with a subjective assessment of the force 
employed to negate the threat.  For this element, a military judge would 
instruct: 
To determine the accused’s actual belief as to the amount of force 
which was necessary, you must look at the situation through the eyes 
of the accused. In addition to the circumstances known to the accused 
at the time, the accused’s (age) (intelligence) (emotional control) 
(__________) are all important factors to consider in determining the 
accused’s actual belief about the amount of force required to protect 
(himself) (herself). As long as the accused actually believed that the 
amount of force (he) (she) used was necessary to protect against 
death or grievous bodily harm, the fact that the accused may have 
 
200. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(e). 
201. MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 193, at para. 5-2-1. 
202. Id. 
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used excessive force (or a different type of force than that used by 
the attacker) does not matter.203 
Thus, force used in response to a threat may be objectively excessive as 
long as the individual had an honest belief it was necessary. 
Unlike many civilian jurisdictions, a military member is not 
required to withdraw from a location to preclude an escalating 
possibility of violence.204  While evidence of the opportunity to 
withdraw is a factor courts will consider, self-defense applies so long 
as the individual is at a place where he has a right to be.205  In contrast, 
the application of self-defense may be precluded for an individual who 
intentionally provokes an incident or voluntarily engages in mutual 
combat.206  A military judge would advise the fact-finder: 
A person has provoked an attack and, therefore, given up the right to 
self-defense if (he) (she) willingly and knowingly does some act 
toward the other person reasonably calculated and intended to lead 
to a fight (or a deadly conflict). Unless such act is clearly calculated 
and intended by the accused to lead to a fight (or a deadly conflict), 
the right to self defense is not lost.207 
Deprivation of self-defense, while possible, thus requires the 
prosecution to conclusively demonstrate an accused’s subjective intent 
to provoke a situation as a justification to use deadly force.   
An accused who provoked an incident or voluntarily engaged in 
mutual combat, however, may still be entitled to claim self-defense 
based upon an opponent’s actions.  If an opponent escalates the level of 
conflict to a point where an accused developed a legitimate, immediate 
fear of serious bodily injury or death, self-defense once again applies.208  
A military judge’s instructions would read:  
 
203. Id. 




208. See, e.g., United States v. Cardwell, 15 MJ 124, 126 (C.M.A. 1983); United 
States v. Dearing, 63 MJ 478, 483 (2006); United States v. Lewis, 65 MJ 85, 87–89 
(2007). 
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Even if you find that the accused (intentionally provoked an attack 
upon (himself) (herself)) (voluntarily engaged in mutual fighting), if 
the adversary escalated the level of the conflict, then the accused was 
entitled to act in self-defense if (he) (she) was in reasonable 
apprehension of immediate death or grievous bodily harm.  
Therefore, if the accused (intentionally provoked an attack upon 
(himself) (herself) by using force not likely to produce death or 
grievous bodily harm) (voluntarily engaged in mutual fighting not 
involving force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm), and 
the adversary escalated the level of the conflict to one involving force 
likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm and thereby placed 
the accused in reasonable apprehension of immediate death or 
grievous bodily harm, the accused was entitled to use force (he) (she) 
actually believed was necessary to prevent death or grievous bodily 
harm.209 
In this situation too, the prosecution bears the burden of proving an 
adversary did not escalate the conflict to a level where the accused 
feared serious injury or death.210  If the prosecution fails to meet this 
burden, self-defense must be the default finding. 
Another unique factor impacting the application of self-defense is 
whether a military accused was performing a law enforcement function 
at the time of the incident.211  The nature of law enforcement often 
requires officers to create situations that may otherwise be deemed as 
provoking an incident or voluntarily engaging in mutual combat.  A law 
enforcement officer, however, has a “duty to protect the public as well 
as to subdue his adversary.”212  Accordingly, a law enforcement officer 
has no duty to “retreat from an affray and stand idly by.” 213  In essence, 
law enforcement personnel acting in an official capacity benefit from a 
broader application of the self-defense doctrine. 
In sum, a U.S. military member charged under the UCMJ with 
killing or injuring another person is automatically granted the legal 
protection of self-defense, whether or not requested, if any evidence 
suggests it may apply.  The UCMJ applies to military personnel 
anywhere in the world, so the protection of self-defense applies across 
 
209. MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 193, at para. 5-2-6. 
210. Id. 
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the face of the globe.  However, the self-defense doctrine does not apply 
on the battlefield, where the ROE control and failure to obey an order 
is a crime unto itself.  
C.  Self-Defense in Civilian Law 
Until relatively recently, state self-defense laws across the U.S. 
were similar in that they were modeled after English Common Law and 
included a duty to retreat if reasonably possible.214  In 2005, however, 
Florida—working closely with the National Rifle Association215— 
adopted a fundamental change to the concept of self-defense by 
amending the state’s law into what is variously known as “True 
Man,”216 “Make My Day,” “Shoot First [Ask Questions Later],” or 
more commonly “Stand your Ground.”217  This new law eliminated any 
duty to retreat,218 bringing it essentially in accord with RCM self-
defense standards.  Emulating Florida, most U.S. states have similarly 
amended their self-defense laws to eliminate any affirmative obligation 
to retreat before use of deadly force.219  Thus, for the purposes of this 
article, Florida law will serve as the template to assess the scope of the 
individual right to self-defense applicable throughout the majority of 
the U.S.  Florida’s Stand Your Ground law is enumerated in § 776.012 
of the state statutes: 
A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he 
or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force 
is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission 
of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly 
 
214. Sara L. Ochs, Can Louisiana’s Self-Defense Law Stand Its Ground?: 
Improving the Stand Your Ground Law in the Murder Capital of America, 59 LOY. L. 
REV. 673, 675–84, (2013). 
215. See Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right to Use Deadly Force in Self-
Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2005, at A1. 
216. Daniel Sweeney, Standing Up to “Stand Your Ground” Laws: How the 
Modern NRA-Inspired Self-Defense Statutes Destroy the Principle of Necessity, 
Disrupt the Criminal Justice System, and Increase Overall Violence, 64 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 715, 722–23, (2016). 
217. Ochs, supra note 214, at 675. 
218. Sweeney, supra note 216, at 717. 
219. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 229 (7th ed. 2015). 
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force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to 
retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using 
or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal 
activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be.220 
The elements necessary to successfully assert self-defense are similar 
to those required under the RCM.  Both require that a defendant 
honestly (subjectively) and reasonably (objectively) believe the use or 
threat of deadly force is necessary to prevent serious physical harm or 
death.221  Notably, neither law requires a defendant to retreat if lawfully 
entitled to be at the location where the threat materialized.222  A point 
of apparent contrast, however, is the opportunity to retreat.  Under the 
RCM, “[t]he availability of avenues of retreat is one factor which may 
be considered in addressing the reasonableness of the accused’s 
apprehension of bodily harm and the sincerity of the accused’s belief 
that the force used was necessary for self-protection.”223  The Florida 
statute fails to offer any guidance regarding the opportunity to retreat.  
The representative who sponsored the bill and a National Rifle 
Association lobbyist, however, expressed hostility towards the 
possibility of retreat being relevant to the use of deadly force.224   
When enacted, the Florida Stand Your Ground law was perceived 
as effectively deputizing every citizen to prevent forcible felonies.225  
With everyone in Florida able to serve as de facto agents of the state, 
that begs the question: what self-defense standards apply to actual 
Florida law enforcement officers?  Florida Statute section 776.05 
details the authority of law enforcement officers to use deadly force: 
A law enforcement officer, or any person whom the officer has 
summoned or directed to assist him or her, need not retreat or desist 
from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or 
 
220. FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2016). 
221. Compare MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(e), with FLA. STAT. § 
776.012(2) (2016). 
222. Id. RCM 916(e)(4) discussion; FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2016). 
223. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(e)(4) discussion. 
224. Sweeney, supra note 216, at 729–30 (noting Florida Representative Dennis 
Baxley, who sponsored the bill, believed the “duty to retreat” actually increases the 
risk of harm to individuals). 
225. Eric Ernst, Too Bad Gun Law Deputizes All of Us, SARASOTA HERALD-
TRIBUNE, Oct. 7, 2005, at BC1. 
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threatened resistance to the arrest. The officer is justified in the use 
of any force: 
(1) Which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary to defend 
himself or herself or another from bodily harm while making the 
arrest. . . 
(a) The officer reasonably believes that the fleeing felon poses a 
threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others 
. . . .226 
The Stand Your Ground law echoes law enforcement standards in 
that an officer “need not retreat or desist” prior to using any degree of 
force.227  As an empowered agent of the state, however, a law 
enforcement officer is constrained by laws limiting excessive use of 
force by the government and may not rely upon the Stand Your Ground 
law which only applies to private citizens.228 
Because the majority of U.S. states have adopted some variant of a 
Stand Your Ground law for individual self-defense, the average 
American citizen is now legally empowered to respond as quickly and 
decisively as any armed police officer or military member to an 
imminent existential threat.  Whether such a dramatic expansion of an 
inherent individual right is a positive development is irrelevant for 
purposes of this article.  Far more important is whether the scope of a 
private citizen’s right to defend himself on the streets of Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania; Des Moines, Iowa; or countless other American cities 
exceeds the legal right of a U.S. military member to defend himself in 
a foreign battlespace.   
III.  NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION APPLICATION  
OF SELF-DEFENSE 
Understanding the structure of NATO and how it operates is vital 
to grasping the unique importance of NATO self-defense standards and 
their applicability to the premise of this article.  NATO is a political and 
military alliance comprised of twenty-nine member states.229  The 
 
226. FLA. STAT. § 776.05(1) (2016). 
227. Id. 
228. See generally State v. Caamano, 105 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2012). 
229. See What is NATO?, NATO, http://www.nato.int/nato-
welcome/index.html# (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
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North Atlantic Council (“NAC”) is the foremost political deliberative 
and decision-making body within the Alliance.230  The NAC is the only 
body created by the North Atlantic Treaty and it is expressly 
empowered to create subordinate bodies.231  Since the inception of 
NATO, official decisions throughout all NATO bodies have been based 
upon consensus of the member nations.232  The consensus process 
means every official NATO decision or action is an “expression of the 
collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the 
Alliance.”233 
The NATO Military Committee (“MC”) is the senior military body 
within the Alliance.  The MC is composed of NATO member nations’ 
defense chiefs, the International Military Staff, and the NATO military 
command structure (Allied Command Operations and Allied Command 
Transformation).234  The MC exists to support and counsel the NAC 
and other subordinate NATO bodies on military subjects. 
  MC 362/1, NATO Rules of Engagement, promulgates the official 
NATO definition and standards for individual self-defense.235  Prepared 
by the MC, MC 362/1 was officially adopted by the NAC on July 22, 
2003.236  In applying the NATO consensus process, every principle 
within MC 362/1 can be deemed at least unopposed if not expressly 
supported by each Alliance member state—including the U.S.   
NATO ROE perform two functions.  During an armed conflict, the 
ROE effectively serve as a restraint upon the use of force in NATO 
 
230. See North Atlantic Council, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-
176292AD-78ECC173/natolive/topics_49763.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
231. North Atlantic Treaty art. 9, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
232. See Consensus Decision-Making at NATO, NATO, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) 
(“Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations 
take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes member 
countries agree to disagree on an issue.  In general, this negotiation process is rapid 
since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and 
understand each other’s positions in advance. Facilitating the process of consultation 
is one of the NATO Secretary General’s main tasks. The consensus principle applies 
throughout NATO.”). 
233. Id. 
234. See What is NATO?, supra note 229. 
235. See generally NATO ROE, supra note 26. 
236. Id. at 1. 
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operations.237  Short of armed conflict, however, NATO ROE provide 
the only authority for the lawful use of force “with the exception of self-
defence.”238  Indeed, NATO ROE “do not limit the inherent right of 
self-defence.”239  Also notable is the observation within MC 362/1 that 
“[i]t is universally recognised that individuals and units have a right to 
defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack.”240  
The twenty-nine sovereign Alliance members have thus all 
accepted the idea that self-defense is universally recognized as an 
inherent right belonging to individual military personnel.  Describing a 
right as inherent is indicative of a natural law origin.  Simultaneously 
describing it as a universally recognized right, however, evokes the 
positive law concept, “general principles of law,” which the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) may apply as one of four 
recognized sources of international law.241  Although there is no single 
authoritative definition, “general principles of law” is commonly 
interpreted to mean principles found within the national laws of states 
around the world or, to a lesser extent, principles originating from 
natural law.242  Of course, international law has historically been 
unconcerned with individual rights.  Furthermore, an individual may 
not be party to an ICJ case; so the fact that a right to individual self-
defense may be a general principle of law is of little consequence to 
U.S. military members.243 
MC 362/1 also contains an important caveat that “individuals and 
units will act in accordance with national law” when exercising the right 
of self-defense.244  Another apparent acknowledgement of positive law, 
this important proposition appears to contradict the surrounding natural 
law language by expressly recognizing the power of a sovereign to limit 
an inherent right.  However, assigning such weight to this statement is 
likely unwarranted.  The actual reason the limitation was included is 
more likely the nature of the Alliance, which is reflected in the 
 
237. Id. at 2. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. (emphasis added). 
240. Id. at 4. 
241. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1. 
242. MURPHY, supra note 36, at 86–87. 
243. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, ¶ 1. 
244. NATO ROE, supra note 26, at 4. 
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statement: “[b]ecause national laws differ, there will not always be 
consistency between the nations as to where the right to use force in 
self-defence ends and the use of force authorised by ROE begins.”245 
The Alliance defines self-defense as “the use of such necessary and 
proportional force, including deadly force, by NATO/NATO-led forces 
and personnel to defend themselves against attack or imminent 
attack.”246  Force is deemed necessary if it “is indispensable for 
securing self-defence,” and proportional if it is both “commensurate 
with the perception of the level of the threat posed” and “limited to the 
degree, intensity, and duration necessary for self-defence and no 
more.”247  An attack is “the use of force against NATO/NATO-led 
forces and personnel,” while an imminent attack means “the need to 
defend is manifest, instant, and overwhelming.”248  Implicit within self-
defense is the concept of extended self-defense: “the right to take 
appropriate measures, including the use of necessary and proportional 
force to defend other NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel from 
attack or imminent attack.”249  
With the exception of nations whose domestic law includes a more 
expansive right (e.g. U.S. SROE 2000), NATO’s definition of self-
defense is effectively treated as the minimum scope of the right an 
individual may assert as justification for the use of force without ROE 
authorization.  Indeed, certain ROE addressing hostile acts and hostile 
intent are precisely tailored to grant all Alliance personnel a similar 
ability to use force and thereby “assure the commander of a combined 
force that the forces under his command will respond uniformly to the 
actions of a potential enemy.”250   
If inconsistency exists with the manner in which self-defense and 
extended self-defense correlates with such ROE force authorization, the 
ROE are “not [to] be interpreted as limiting the right of self-defence.”251  
This point is best illustrated with the tactical guidance issued by U.S. 
Marine Corps General John R. Allen, former commander of 
 
245. NATO ROE, supra note 26, at A-1-1. 




250. Id. at A-1-1. 
251. Id. at 4. 
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International Security Assistance Force & United States Forces-
Afghanistan.  His guidance to all Alliance forces sought to dramatically 
curtail the use of force—and thus civilian casualties—by imposing 
more stringent criteria before use of force would be justified.252  Of 
critical importance, however, is inclusion of the statement “my 
direction in no way compromises the inherent right of every individual 
and unit to employ appropriate measures in self-defense.”253  Given the 
way self-defense is operationally implemented by the Alliance, NATO 
self-defense standards can be considered to constitute the universally 
accepted minimum scope of the inherent right of self-defense an 
individual military member is entitled to assert.  
IV.  RECOGNIZING & RESTORING INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE 
When a nation engages in armed conflict, any aspect of normally 
applicable law—lex generalis—that conflicts with the focused, 
situation specific law—lex specialis—is superseded.254  The law of 
armed conflict (“LOAC”) is an example of lex specialis.  LOAC 
imposes an array of legal obligations upon nations that require military 
leaders to impose a greater risk of harm or death upon their own forces 
in order to minimize the risk to civilians not participating in the 
conflict.255  The crux of the debate about the scope of individual self-
defense for military members is how to properly allocate such increased 
risk based upon legal and moral obligations. 
Individual self-defense for both military members and civilians is a 
right firmly rooted in natural law, not a privilege that can be granted or 
revoked at the whim of a sovereign.  The essence of a natural law right 
precludes it from being unduly curtailed by positive law enactments 
 
252. See generally SAF/USFOR-A, COMISAF’S TACTICAL DIRECTIVE, Nov. 
30, 2011. 
253. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
254. Colonel Gary P. Corn, Should the Best Offense Ever Be a Good Defense? 
The Public Authority to Use Force in Military Operations: Recalibrating the Use of 
Force Rules in the Standing Rules of Engagement, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 34 
(2016). 
255. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1979). 
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such as ROE.  Such a contention is buttressed by comparative law 
considerations from the description of individual self-defense in NATO 
ROE.  NATO protects individual self-defense on the battlefield by 
affirmatively acknowledging its status as an inherent right incapable of 
undue regulation.  Finally, there is a strong moral and pragmatic case 
against limiting the self-defense right of individual military members.  
The ill-advised adoption of SROE 2005 has fostered a culture of risk 
aversion, pitting the personal career interests of officers higher in the 
chain of command against the personal survival interests of their 
subordinates. 
  Assuming for argument’s sake the federal government is able to 
unilaterally restrict a natural law right, a key question for any federal 
law or regulation is whether it is properly implemented in accord with 
the U.S. Constitution.  In the case of SROE limiting individual self-
defense, the relevant constitutional authority is either Congress’s ability 
to regulate the land and naval forces, the President’s Commander in 
Chief authority, or a component of both.256  Unless the SROE are 
exclusively an exercise of Presidential power, however, their direct 
conflict with the RCM’s grant of an absolute legal right to individual 
self-defense poses a constitutional separation of powers issue, with 
individual military members inextricably caught in the middle.   
A.  Natural Law vs. Public Authority Doctrine 
As an inherent natural law right, individual self-defense cannot be 
curtailed by the state.  Reliance upon the implicitly limiting positive 
law doctrine of public authority as a replacement for an absolute right 
is improper and contrary to the essence of natural law jurisprudence.  
Like every American civilian throughout the country, U.S. military 
members retain an unabridged right to life—and thus self-defense—
while serving. 
Implicit within the concept of military service is a duty for military 
members to accept and accomplish any officially assigned duty, despite 
the risk of serious personal injury or death.257  In military operations, 
 
256. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
257. See generally David Barno & Nora Bensahel, The Deepest Obligation of 
Citizenship: Looking Beyond the Warrior Caste, WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 15, 2018), 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/05/the-deepest-obligation-of-citizenship-looking-
beyond-the-warrior-caste/ (noting individuals “knew that they might be called up and 
43
Bengs: Self-Defense Under Siege:  Creeping Criminalization of Individual
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Bengs camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2020  9:26 AM 
380 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
however, an individual military member is not alone in the motivation 
to minimize the possibility of personally suffering serious injury or 
death while performing assigned duties.  The military organization 
itself has an interest in minimizing the loss of trained military personnel 
while balancing the LOAC requirement to avoid unnecessary civilian 
casualties.  This truism was perhaps most eloquently summarized by 
famed World War II General George S. Patton, Jr.  “No dumb bastard,” 
he said, “ever won a war by going out and dying for his country. He 
won it by making some other dumb bastard die for his country.”258   
The term Pyrrhic victory—victory obtained only through 
significant losses leaving the military victor in essentially the same 
position for the future as if it had lost—embodies the competing 
interests of military leaders between accomplishing missions and 
avoiding loss of personnel.259  Military leaders must constantly 
determine which interest is more important, while individual military 
members understandably seek to maximize self-preservation.  The 
inherent tension between self-preservation and acceptance of personal 
risk in support of mission accomplishment is both known and expected 
by military organizations.260  For instance, the Medal of Honor is 
reserved for personnel “who distinguish themselves conspicuously by 
 
required to serve in uniform, setting aside whatever life plans they may have had, 
knowing that they might return home broken, disfigured, or not at all”). 
258. See No Bastard Ever Won a War by Dying for His Country, QUOTE 
INVESTIGATOR, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/04/24/war/#note-11055-6 (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
259. Evan Andrews, 5 Famous Pyrrhic Victories, HISTORY (Aug. 29, 2018) 
https://www.history.com/news/5-famous-pyrrhic-victories. 
260. Consider additional insight from General Patton: “Every man is scared in 
his first battle. If he says he’s not he’s a liar. Some men are cowards but they fight the 
same as the brave men or they get the hell slammed out of them watching men fight 
who are just as scared as they are. The real hero is the man who fights even though he 
is scared. 
Some men get over their fright in a minute under fire. For some it takes an hour. For 
some it takes days. But a real man will never let his fear of death overpower his honor 
his sense of duty to his country and his innate manhood.” See George S. Patton, Jr., 
GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/65615-every-man-is-scared-in-his-
first-battle-if-he (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
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gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of their lives above and beyond the 
call of duty.”261 
The unique nature of military service and the inherent risk of 
military duty are both recognized within the natural law roots of 
individual self-defense.  The scope of the natural law individual right 
of self-defense belonging to military personnel is narrower than the 
same right possessed by civilians.  Although John Locke describes 
individual self-defense as a “fundamental law of nature,”262 he also 
notes:  
the preservation of the army . . . requires an absolute obedience to 
the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to 
disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them . . . 
because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which 
the commander has his power . . . .263   
Locke made this statement to demonstrate a crucial point: “the first and 
fundamental natural law . . . is the preservation of the society, and (as 
far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it.”264   
The limited scope of individual self-defense for military personnel 
noted by Locke is thus premised upon the greater good of society.  
Accordingly, entry into military service unquestionably alters the legal 
rights and responsibilities of individuals.  The transition from civilian 
to military member results not in the complete loss of all individual 
rights, however, but rather in a selective diminution of certain rights to 
maximize collective discipline and duty within the force.265  Whether 
the natural law right of individual self-defense is entirely curtailed by 
military service has remained an open question during the ongoing 
counterinsurgency efforts against Islamic extremism.266   
 
261. 1 Manual of Military Decorations and Awards, in Dep’t of Def. Manual § 
1348.33, at 31 (Nov. 23, 2010) (incorporating change July 10, 2014) (emphasis 
added). 
262. LOCKE, supra note 109, at 14. 
263. Id. at 74. 
264. Id. at 69. 
265. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743–44 (1974). 
266. Compare Corn, supra note 254, with Major David Bolgiano, et al., 
Defining the Right of Self-Defense: Working Toward the Use of a Deadly Force 
Appendix to the Standing Rules of Engagement for the Department of Defense, 31 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 157 (2002). 
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One commentator, U.S. Army Colonel Gary P. Corn, contends that 
the legal nature of self-defense for military personnel and law 
enforcement officers performing official duties is entirely distinct from 
civilians.267  According to Colonel Corn, military members cease to be 
individuals and instead transform solely into state agents while 
performing their duties.268  The purported result of this transformation 
is that the nature of self-defense changes from an individual right to a 
collective right belonging to the state under the “public authority 
doctrine.”269  Thus, military members are not entitled to defend their 
lives without advance authorization from their unit commander. 
Such a contention warrants a more detailed exploration of the 
public authority doctrine.  Public authority provides a legal justification 
for otherwise illegal acts, such as homicide.  Unlike individual self-
defense, which is always available to everyone, only a limited group 
specifically empowered to advance a legitimate governmental interest 
can assert public authority as a bar to personal criminal liability.270  In 
warfare, the de facto immunity from prosecution enjoyed by lawful 
combatants for any homicides committed to advance the state’s war 
effort exemplifies the public authority doctrine.271  Similarly, a civilian 
law enforcement officer relies upon public authority for the use of force 
to accomplish a lawful arrest.272 
The MCM defines “justification” as a specific defense to criminal 
liability for a “death, injury, or other act caused or done in the proper 
performance of a legal duty.”273  The scope and rationale of justification 
is effectively identical to the public authority doctrine.  For example, 
use of force by law enforcement officers to apprehend a suspect or kill 
an enemy combatant in battle is protected under the MCM.274  It is 
reasonable, therefore, to consider justification and the public authority 
doctrine as one in the same.  Particularly worth noting is the fact that, 
 
267. See generally Corn, supra note 254. 
268. Id. at 25–27. 
269. Id. at 27–31. 
270. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 215–16 (1982). 
271. Corn, supra note 254, at 28. 
272. Id. at 30. 
273. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(c). 
274. Id. at RCM 916(c) discussion. 
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like self-defense, a military judge has a sua sponte obligation to instruct 
a fact-finder regarding justification when the issue has been raised by 
the evidence, even when not initially asserted by the defense.275  The 
practical consequence of this independent judicial obligation is that a 
military member could conceivably be eligible to assert both 
justification and individual self-defense.  Such a possibility undermines 
the contention that public authority (justification) entirely displaces 
individual self-defense. 
Justification is easily applied to official acts not involving 
individual self-defense.  Self-defense situations, however, are unique in 
that only the continued existence of the individual, not the state, is in 
jeopardy.  If there is disparity between use of force under the public 
authority doctrine and the right of individual self-defense, whether 
public authority does or should entirely displace the individual right is 
both a legal and moral question.  In any case, by separately enumerating 
individual self-defense as a special defense for homicide, assault 
involving deadly force, or battery involving deadly force,276 the MCM 
indicates military members do not automatically lose the right of 
individual self-defense.  This interpretation is consistent with the 
longstanding American idea that individuals have certain inalienable 
rights, including the right to life.277   
According to Colonel Corn, the state alone controls the public 
authority right to use force.278  Consequently, “[the state] is free to 
impose a threat trigger and conditions on the authority of its agents to 
respond.”279  Imposition of a requirement to obtain permission from a 
unit commander before using force in self-defense is consistent with the 
public authority concept only if individuals truly lose an independent 
right to life while in military service.  Yet, it seems counterintuitive to 
argue that U.S. military members do not have an independent, 
defensible right to life because the state that placed them in a foreign 
 
275. MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 193, at para. 5-20. 
276. Compare MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(c), with MCM, supra note 192, 
RCM 916(e). 
277. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“among these 
are Life”). 
278. Corn, supra note 254, at 31. 
279. Id. 
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battlespace has a more important obligation to prevent potential 
incidental harm to foreign civilians.   
Recall that justification is a defense to criminal liability for “death, 
injury, or other act caused or done in the proper performance of a legal 
duty.” 280  The state unquestionably has exclusive control over every 
military member’s legal duty to act.  The definition of ROE as 
“[d]irectives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will 
initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces 
encountered”281 makes that clear.  In essence, ROE define the existence 
and scope of a military member’s legal duty to act and use force within 
a battlespace.  They function as a positive grant of authority to use force 
on behalf of the state in specified situations where an individual would 
not otherwise be legally entitled to act or use such force. 
For decades prior to the adoption of U.S. SROE 2005, the “inherent 
right to use all necessary means available and to take appropriate 
actions to defend oneself and U.S. forces in one’s vicinity”282 was 
explicitly recognized and incorporated as a legal right tied to a military 
member’s legal duty to act and use force within a battlespace.  
Individual self-defense was in synergistic alignment with the public 
authority doctrine.  The longstanding presence of an individual right 
was not perceived as a legal or moral problem until the nature of modern 
counterinsurgency warfare rendered it a potential strategic liability.283  
Since 2005, public authority has effectively displaced individual 
self-defense as the rationale for use of force within the ROE.  Although 
the 2005 change was disguised as a seemingly innocuous textual 
modification, the practical outcome is the legal and moral quandary 
faced by Sgt. Meyer and all other U.S. military members in combat.  
Military members who violate the ROE to defend themselves and their 
peers from attack face two main possibilities for criminal prosecution.  
Those who face court-martial charges of homicide, assault involving 
deadly force, battery involving deadly force, or assault with a dangerous 
 
280. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(c). 
281. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-04, LEGAL SUPPORT TO MILITARY 
OPERATIONS GL-3 (Aug. 2, 2016). 
282. U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para. 5(e). 
283. FM 3-24, supra note 13, at para. 1-150. 
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weapon still benefit from individual self-defense under RCM 916(e).284  
In contrast, the more likely charge of failure to obey orders285 now 
entirely precludes assertion of individual self-defense due to the 2005 
amendments.  
If public authority applies equally to military members and law 
enforcement officers, it is reasonable to compare the self-defense 
standards of one group to the other.  Such a comparison demonstrates 
the absurdity of the lack of trust in individual military members 
embraced by U.S. SROE 2005.  The legal parameters for use of deadly 
force by law enforcement are such that it must effectively be either self-
defense or defense of others.286  Law enforcement officers in the U.S. 
killed 963 people in 2016, 987 in 2017, and 998 in 2018.287  During that 
period, the social and political movement Black Lives Matter actively 
questioned police legitimacy arising out of “violence inflicted on Black 
communities by the state.”288  Thus, erroneous use of self-defense by 
law enforcement officers created the same type of negative strategic 
outcomes feared by military leaders engaged in counterinsurgency 
warfare.   
The prospect of declaring U.S. police officers incapable of properly 
assessing the consequences of their actions and instead requiring them 
to individually contact the chief-of-police for permission to defend 
themselves or others is an idea so extreme that it would never even be 
considered.  It is also worth noting that erroneous victims of a law 
enforcement officer’s unrestricted individual self-defense right are 
Americans with full constitutional rights, while potential erroneous 
victims of a military member’s self-defense right are not.  Again, 
arguing that foreign citizens in a battlespace deserve greater protections 
 
284. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(e). 
285. Arts. 90 and 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 892. 
286. See generally Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985); Graham v. Connor, 
490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
287. 2019 Police Shootings Database, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-
2019/?utm_term=.761b29923dc1 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
288. About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2020); Ryan W. Miller, Black Lives Matter: A Primer on What It Is 
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from the use of force by U.S. military members than U.S. citizens in an 
American city is hardly credible.  Even if accepting the public authority 
doctrine as exclusively controlling, the inherent right of self-defense 
can and must still exist for individual military members. 
B. Military Theory – Morality & Pragmatism 
Apart from the legal issues, there exists a question about the moral 
obligation citizens of a democratic republic have towards their 
defenders.  Taken together, active and reserve military members 
comprise approximately 0.4% of the U.S. population, with veterans 
accounting for an additional 7%.289  The vast majority of U.S. citizens 
will never spend a day in uniform nor encounter a situation where the 
scope of their individual self-defense right is relevant.  Should these 
civilians care that the small fraction of fellow Americans who serve are 
sent to face death in foreign lands without the same robust self-defense 
right enjoyed by those who stay home? 
The issue of self-defense is simply one aspect of a larger moral 
problem currently facing military and civilian leaders.  LOAC 
obligations require states to avoid military actions that cause excessive 
death or injury to civilians in the battlespace.290  In the context of 
counterinsurgency warfare in populated areas, this obligation drives 
states to choose between maximizing protection of their own 
combatants and maximizing protection of foreign civilians.291  The 
modification of self-defense in U.S. SROE 2005 suggests U.S. military 
leaders have chosen to prioritize protection of foreign civilians.  Does 
the morality of such a momentous decision warrant an informed public 
debate by our civilian leaders?   
 
289. Mona Chalabi, What Percentage of Americans Have Served in the 
Military?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-percentage-of-americans-have-served-in-
the-military/. 
290. See Art. 51, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 
1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977. 
291. See generally Ziv Bohrer & Mark Osiel, Proportionality in Military Force 
at War’s Multiple Levels: Averting Civilian Casualties vs. Safeguarding Soldiers, 46 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747 (2013). 
50
California Western Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], No. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss2/3
Bengs camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete) 6/29/2020  9:26 AM 
2020] SELF-DEFENSE UNDER SIEGE 387 
Tight control over the use of force by individual military members 
is an extension of counterinsurgency principles urging commanders to 
“calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who 
wields it for any operation.  An operation that kills five insurgents is 
counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty 
more insurgents.”292  Thus, ROE that vest commanders with sole 
discretion for individual self-defense by subordinate personnel require 
the commander to balance the prospect of authorizing force—a 
potential career-ending mistake—against the continued safety and 
survival of subordinates.  Sgt. Meyer experienced the unfortunate 
outcome of that situation when his requests to act were denied a total of 
four times.293  The officers who steadfastly denied his requests were 
ultimately administratively disciplined with letters of reprimand, but 
that does not signify the ROE system that created such a situation is 
fixed.294 
The strategic reasons for vesting commanders with the authority to 
control all uses of force by their subordinates are rightly 
understandable.  Nevertheless, a de facto ROE system that pits the 
personal promotion and career interests of unit commanders, often at a 
distant headquarters, against the self-defense interest of subordinates is 
fundamentally flawed.  The truth of the matter is that dead subordinates 
are the result of enemy action while dead civilians resulting from self-
defense are the result of the commander who authorized force.  Which 
decision is the safest legal choice for a commander?  Likewise, which 
decision is the safest moral choice for a commander?  If the answer to 
these two questions is not the same, there is a definite problem with the 
system.  
The U.S. Army’s mission command doctrine has drawn criticism 
for its flawed understanding and improper implementation of 
Auftragstaktik.295  Thus, it is worth exploring Auftragstaktik in greater 
detail.  Auftragstaktik dictates that decisions regarding use of force in 
 
292. FM 3-24, supra note 13, at para. 1-141. 
293. The Obama Whitehouse, supra note 2. 
294. Larry Shaughnessy, In Medal of Honor Battle, Senior Officers Failed, 
CNN (Sept. 16, 2011), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/16/in-medal-of-honor-
battle-senior-officers-failed/ 
295. See generally Matzenbacher, supra note 28, at 62. 
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combat are best left to individuals actually in the battlespace.296  
Initially conceived by Frederick the Great, Auftragstaktik was not fully 
developed and implemented by the German military until the mid-
nineteenth century.297  This concept is credited for many of the military 
successes enjoyed by Prussia and the newly unified Germany.298  
General Patton is again an eloquent source for this fundamental military 
concept with his admonition: “[d]on’t tell people how to do things, tell 
them what to do and let them surprise you with their results.”299  Despite 
its obvious success within the German military and a handful of 
insightful U.S. military leaders, Auftragstaktik did not formally make 
its way into U.S. military doctrine until the 1980s when the Army 
adopted it as the philosophy of mission command.300 
 Auftragstaktik is comprised of four component parts: (1) the 
commander’s stated objective, (2) confidence in subordinates’ 
proficiencies, (3) his and subordinates’ appreciation of their respective 
responsibilities, and (4) subordinates’ freedom to act.301  In essence, 
this entire concept depends upon a shared understanding and mutual 
trust between the commander and subordinates.302  U.S. SROE 2005 
effectively eliminated mutual trust by removing individual military 
members’ freedom to act in self-defense.  Although commanders can 
always grant permission, U.S. SROE 2005 establishes the default that 
no junior personnel—even senior non-commissioned officers—can be 
trusted to make the correct decision on individual self-defense due to 
the potential risk of error.  All of this begs the question of why the state 
is sending masses of inherently untrusted agents to act on its behalf.  
Individuals who cannot be trusted to know when use of force is 
 
296. Thomas E. Ricks, An Elusive Command Philosophy And A Different 
Command Culture, FOREIGN POLICY  
 (Sept. 9, 2011), https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/09/an-elusive-command-
philosophy-and-a-different-command-culture/. 
297. Id. 
298. Widder, supra note 29, at 4. 
299. George S. Patton, Jr. Quotes, GOODREADS, 
https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/370054.George_S_Patton_Jr (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2020). 
300. Matzenbacher, supra note 28, at 62. 
301. Widder, supra note 29, at 9. 
302. Matzenbacher, supra note 28, at 70. 
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necessary in self-defense should likewise not be trusted to know when 
use of force is necessary in any situation. 
C.  Constitutional Concerns 
The U.S. Constitution splits authority to control and regulate U.S. 
military forces between the executive and legislative branches.  
Congress has exclusive power “[t]o make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”303 while the President is 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and 
of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service 
of the United States.”304  The nature and scope of Congressional 
authority is relatively clear, but the same cannot be said of Presidential 
authority.305   
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
question, it has implied SROE would fall under the purview of both 
branches.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court stated: 
The Constitution makes the President the “Commander in Chief” of 
the Armed Forces, Art. II, §2, cl. 1, but vests in Congress the powers 
to “declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land 
and Water,” Art. I, §8, cl. 11, to “raise and support Armies,” id., cl. 
12, to “define and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,” 
id., cl. 10, and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces,” id., cl. 14. The interplay between these 
powers was described by Chief Justice Chase in the seminal case of 
Ex parte Milligan . . . .306 
Cited favorably in Hamdan, Chief Justice Chase’s concurring opinion 
in Ex Parte Milligan contains a more specific articulation of the 
separation of powers: 
 
303. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
305. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), the U.S. 
Supreme Court identified a limit to President Truman’s assertion of commander in 
chief power.  See also Gregory E. Maggs, Judicial Review of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, 160 MIL. L. REV. 96, 134 (1999) (“The scope of the President’s power to 
create rules without UCMJ authority remains contested.”). 
306. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006). 
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Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern 
armies, but to declare war. It has therefore the power to provide by 
law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all 
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success 
except such as interferes with the command of the forces and the 
conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President 
as commander-in-chief. Both these powers are derived from the 
Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent 
must be determined by their nature and by the principles of our 
institutions. 
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress [emphasis 
added], the power to execute in the President. Both powers imply 
many subordinate and auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities 
essential to its due exercise. But neither can the President, in war 
more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress 
[emphasis added], nor Congress upon the proper authority of the 
President. . . Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor 
can the President, or any commander under him, without the 
sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment 
of offences, either of soldiers or civilians [emphasis added], unless 
in cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies what it compels, 
or at least insures acts of indemnity from the justice of the 
legislature.307 
Recall the executive branch—the Department of Defense—
controls and administers the SROE, which are promulgated as a 
Chairman Of The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Instruction.308  Whether the 
Chairman is acting under a statutory grant of authority from 
Congress,309 the President’s implicit authority as commander in chief, 
or both, is an unsettled question.  In contrast, the RCM are promulgated 
by the President as an executive order within the MCM,310 under an 
explicit legislative grant of authority found in Article 36 of the UCMJ, 
which also imposes some important conditions: 
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, 
for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial . . . may 
be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as 
 
307. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 139–40 (1866). 
308. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14. 
309. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 153 (2018). 
310. Maggs, supra note 305, at 96. 
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he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of 
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the 
United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or 
inconsistent with this chapter. 
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform 
insofar as practicable.311   
In establishing the operational legal framework of courts-martial the 
President is thus expected to adhere to the maximum extent possible to 
the principles and rules of federal courts.  Moreover, uniformity 
(absence of conflicts or disparities) is to be maximized. 
That Congress has historically granted the President wide-ranging 
discretion to articulate the rules for military trials has not escaped the 
notice of the U.S. Supreme Court.  In 1957, the Court expressed 
apprehension about the constitutional validity of such an open-ended 
delegation: 
If the President can provide rules of substantive law as well as 
procedure, then he and his military subordinates exercise legislative, 
executive and judicial powers with respect to those subject to 
military trials. Such blending of functions in one branch of the 
Government is the objectionable thing which the draftsmen of the 
Constitution endeavored to prevent by providing for the separation 
of governmental powers.312 
To the extent that the self-defense limitations imposed in U.S. SROE 
2005 function as a standard of substantive criminal law, they pose a 
separation of powers concern.   
Nevertheless, as commander in chief, the President possesses some 
amount of inherent authority to create the SROE and RCM,313 so the 
three-prong test articulated in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer314 is also worth considering.  
First, if the President “acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.”315  The 
RCM seem to fall squarely in this category.  Second, if the President 
 
311. Art. 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006). 
312. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38–39 (1957). 
313. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 770 (1996). 
314. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
315. Id. at 635. 
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“acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, 
he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone 
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or 
in which its distribution is uncertain.”316  The status of the SROE is 
difficult to conclusively identify, but it likely falls under this category.  
Finally, if the President “takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”317  
Given the expansive nature of the relevant legislative and executive 
constitutional powers, a separation of powers issue would likely need 
to fall within this category. 
Prosecuting a military member for personally deciding to use force 
in violation of the ROE by exercising the absolute, inherent right to self-
defense Congress indirectly and the President directly provided in RCM 
916 raises several important questions.  Does the existence of such a 
legislative and executive granted self-defense right interfere with the 
President’s command of the forces and conduct of campaigns?318  Is the 
executive branch acting ultra vires (beyond or in excess of its 
powers)319 and intruding upon the exclusive law-making authority of 
Congress by curtailing the longstanding SROE right of individual self-
defense?   
It is difficult to argue the robust individual self-defense right under 
RCM 916 interferes with executive branch’s command of military 
forces and conduct of campaigns.  There was no possibility of 
interference prior to 2005 because the nature and scope of individual 
self-defense was effectively the same under the SROE and RCM 916.320  
Any conflict between them is purely a product of executive 
inconsistency because the President has substantial legislative authority 
over both the RCM and SROE.  The only point of potential interference 
now is with the unit commander permission requirement, since the 
removal of individual discretion in U.S. SROE 2005 did not prohibit 
use of force for individual self-defense.  In a clear demonstration that 
application of the traditional self-defense right reflected in RCM 916 
does not interfere with military campaigns, President Obama personally 
 
316. Id. at 637. 
317. Id. 
318. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
319. See Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
320. Compare U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, with MCM, supra note 192, 
RCM 916(e). 
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awarded Sgt. Meyer the nation’s highest military honor—for actions 
directly violating the permission requirement.321  
A more salient question is whether imposition of the requirement 
for unit commander permission before engaging in individual self-
defense—and the resulting criminalization of actions taken without 
permission—amounts to the executive branch usurping Congress’ sole 
authority to make law.  The President lacks the ability to redefine 
substantive elements of UCMJ offenses in RCM provisions,322 yet a 
U.S. military member acting in self-defense without the unit 
commander’s permission would be an essential element of either an 
Article 90 or 92 UCMJ violation. 
Congress established the crime of failure to obey orders in Article 
92 of the UCMJ.323  A similar offense, willfully disobeying a superior 
commissioned officer, is found in Article 90 of the UCMJ.324  While 
Article 90 criminalizes willful violation of a lawful order, Article 92 
does not require willfulness or even knowledge of the order in some 
situations.325  Because any order can serve as a key element of the 
offense, Congress specified that the order must be lawful, meaning 
“[t]he order must not conflict with the statutory or constitutional rights 
of the person receiving the order.”326  The constitutional status of the 
SROE self-defense permission requirement is thus connected to the 
separate question of whether it is a lawful order.  
While the UCMJ is a statute, RCM 916 is promulgated by the 
President acting under a statutory grant of authority.327  RCM 916 
establishes clear, objective criteria for an individual right to use force 
in self-defense, but does not include the SROE permission 
requirement.328  When a unit commander refuses subordinates 
permission to defend themselves, it is the equivalent of an order not to 
use force contrary to RCM 916’s inherent right to do so.  Nevertheless, 
such a refusal is unlikely to be considered an illegal order because the 
self-defense right in RCM 916 issued by the President is not per se a 
 
321. See The Obama Whitehouse, supra note 2. 
322. See Maggs, supra note 305, at 129. 
323. Art. 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892. 
324. Art. 90, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 890. 
325. Compare id., with Art. 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892. 
326. MCM, supra note 192, Art. 90(c)(2)(a)(v); MCM Art. 92(c)(1)(c). 
327. Art. 36, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006). 
328. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(e). 
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statutory right, even though it was created with legislative authority.  
Accordingly, the executive branch is not usurping legislative authority 
to create a substantive crime, and thus there is no constitutional 
separation of powers issue.  
CONCLUSION 
Advocating for restoration of an ancient, previously recognized 
natural law right is intrinsically illogical because such rights are 
absolute under natural law jurisprudence, and thus impossible to restrict 
or revoke.  Nevertheless, it is time to restore the unabridged right to 
individual self-defense for U.S. military members serving in a foreign 
battlespace.  The limitations upon individual self-defense imposed by 
U.S. SROE 2005 must be removed and replaced with a return to the 
inherent individual self-defense standards espoused in U.S. SROE 
2000. 
An active battlespace imposes numerous limitations not typically 
encountered in the U.S.  One limitation is the ability to collect evidence 
in accord with requisite forensic standards.329  This procedural 
limitation makes UCMJ charges of failure to obey orders330 much more 
likely than homicide, assault, or battery.  In such a case, the lack of a 
recognized individual self-defense right in U.S. SROE 2005 renders 
self-defense inapplicable if the unit commander did not grant 
permission in advance.331 As a result of the conflict between the self-
defense standards in U.S. SROE 2005 and RCM 916, the same use of 
force in self-defense that applies to preclude liability for offenses 
carrying the possibility of death or life imprisonment332 is rendered 
criminal.  Notably, no such problem exists in the U.S. for civilians, law 
enforcement officers, or even U.S. military members outside of a 
battlespace.  It is a cruel irony that this unjust double standard applies 
only in foreign battlespaces where U.S. military members face the 
greatest threat to life.   
U.S. law enforcement officers who seriously injure or kill a U.S. 
citizen while performing their duties are subject to criminal charges 
 
329. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, CRIME SCENE AND 
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AWARENESS FOR NON-FORENSIC PERSONNEL (2009). 
330. Arts. 90 and 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 892. 
331. U.S. SROE 2005, supra note 14. 
332. Art. 118, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2019). 
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under state or federal law, and remain entitled to assert the right of 
individual self-defense to preclude conviction.333  Although officers act 
under the public authority doctrine, they retain an unrestricted right to 
individual self-defense.  Similarly, U.S. military members who 
seriously injure or kill a foreign citizen in a foreign battlespace while 
performing their duties can be charged with a crime under the UCMJ, 
and are entitled to assert self-defense as provided by RCM 916.  U.S. 
military members may continue to use force in self-defense secure in 
the knowledge that military criminal law continues to recognize self-
defense as an inherent right, but only in the context of homicide, assault 
involving deadly force, or battery involving deadly force.334  Unlike law 
enforcement officers, however, U.S. military members may be charged 
and convicted of failure to obey an order not to use force in self-defense 
if they did so without unit commander permission.335  Thus military 
members like Sgt. Meyer, who decide to defend themselves and their 
comrades, face greater legal risk if they do not kill a foreign civilian 
than if they do.  Only returning to the self-defense standards of U.S. 
SROE 2000 will correct this perverse incentive. 
The U.S. military conducts many foreign operations in conjunction 
with the forces of an allied nation.336  Coalition operations are easier if 
there exists a common self-defense standard to apply.337  Recognizing 
this benefit, NATO ROE include an explicit recognition of self-
defense338 as an inherent right of individual military members, just as it 
was in U.S. SROE 2000.  NATO self-defense standards serve as a 
commonly accepted minimum scope of the right to individual self-
defense to which a military member is entitled.  A return to that 
common baseline would decrease disparity between U.S. military 
members and NATO allies when responding to hostile acts. 
 
333. See generally Mitch Smith, Jurors Believed Their Eyes, Not Officer’s 
Words, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2018, at A17. 
334. MCM, supra note 192, RCM 916(e) 
335. See Arts. 90 and 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 892. 
336. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan involved 
personnel from fifty NATO and partner nations. NATO and Afghanistan, NATO (Mar. 
2, 2020), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm.  The Multi-National 
Force in Iraq involved personnel from thirty-seven allied nations.  STEPHEN A. 
CARNEY, ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 1 (2011). 
337. SAN REMO HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 2. 
338. NATO ROE, supra note 26. 
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Military pragmatism and joint doctrine support a robust individual 
right of self-defense.  The U.S. military concept of mission command, 
derived from the German Auftragstaktik doctrine,339 advocates that 
“[c]ommanders delegate decisions to subordinates wherever possible, 
which minimizes detailed control and empowers subordinates’ 
initiative to make decisions based on the commander’s guidance rather 
than constant communications.”340  The concept of decentralized 
mission execution renders loss of communication with the commander 
less disruptive to achieving the mission objective.341  A key requirement 
of mission command, however, is that subordinate personnel are 
entrusted to “exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and 
independently to accomplish the mission.”342  Eliminating the inherent 
right of individual self-defense demonstrates a lack of trust in 
subordinates, and is premised upon a presumed collective lack of the 
disciplined initiative necessary for mission success. 
Sgt. Meyer’s experience highlights the moral issue raised by 
imposing a permission requirement for individual self-defense.  The 
current ROE structure now pits the personal promotion and career 
prospects of unit commanders against the self-defense interests of 
subordinates.  For a military professional, the career risk of dead 
subordinates resulting from enemy action is often less than the risk of 
dead foreign civilians resulting from the action of U.S. military 
members.  This implicit conflict of interest is not something any unit 
commander should ever have to consider.  Restoring the inherent right 
of individual self-defense would entirely eliminate the concern.  
Congress and the President share some degree of concurrent 
authority over the SROE and RCM, but only the President is directly 
responsible for the substantive content of both sources.  Inasmuch as 
there is a conflict between the individual self-defense right articulated 
by RCM 916 and U.S. SROE 2005, it is an issue for the executive 
branch to resolve.  A relevant question is thus which standard should 
control.  The President issued RCM 916 “pursuant to an express 
 
339. Matzenbacher, supra note 28, at 62. 
340. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS II-2 (Jan. 17, 
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authorization of Congress,”343 so it has maximum constitutional 
authority.  In contrast, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs relied on the 
President’s inherent power as commander in chief, implied statutory 
authorization,344 or both, when issuing U.S. SROE 2005.  
Consequently, U.S. SROE 2005 falls within the “zone of twilight in 
which he [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, 
or in which its distribution is uncertain.”345  U.S. SROE 2005 therefore 
has less constitutional authority relative to RCM 916.  Although there 
is no separation of powers issue, as a general matter of policy, it is 
unfair to maintain and apply conflicting self-defense standards to U.S. 
military members.  
Finally, embracing the counterinsurgency principle that 
“Sometimes Doing Nothing is the Best Reaction,”346 the goal of the unit 
commander permission requirement implemented by U.S. SROE 2005 
was to limit potential foreign civilian casualties.  Although a worthy 
goal, curtailing the right of individual self-defense impedes mission 
command, and is contrary to the most sacrosanct tenet of U.S. military 
service: leave no one behind.347  The best method of enabling military 
members to “exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and 
independently to accomplish the mission”348 is robust training on the 
prerequisites for individual self-defense, namely necessity, 
proportionality, and de-escalation.349   
The obligation to never abandon a comrade represented by the 
leave no one behind mantra is directly undermined by the unit 
commander permission requirement.  Although Sgt. Meyer ultimately 
received the Medal of Honor for his actions in support of his fallen 
comrades, the fact that he was forced to commit a crime to fulfill the 
obligation demonstrates the absurd unfairness of the standard.  The U.S. 
 
343. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). Article 36 of 
the UCMJ grants the President authority to issue such rules. 
344. 10 U.S.C. § 153 (2018). 
345. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637. 
346. FM 3-24, supra note 13, at 1-27. 
347. The obligation is included in the Soldier’s Creed (“I will never leave a 
fallen comrade”) and the Airman’s Creed (“I will never leave an Airman behind”). 
See Soldier’s Creed, ARMY.MIL, https://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2020); Vision, U.S. AIR FORCE, 
https://www.airforce.com/mission/vision (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
348. JP 3-0, supra note 340, at II-2. 
349. U.S. SROE 2000, supra note 15, at enclosure A, para 5(f). 
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asks a great deal of its military personnel, the least it can do is grant 
them the legal and moral protections they deserve while serving in 
harm’s way.   
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